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INTRODUCTION
In the decade of intense competition since Congress partially der-
egulated the interstate trucking industry,' most motor carriers 2 have
abandoned their former practice of strictly observing collectively-es-
tablished freight rates. 3 Instead, they have adopted the general prac-
tice of negotiating to transport a shipper's 4 goods at freight rates
which have often been substantially lower than carriers have charged
for the same transportation in the past. In the wake of regulatory
reform, carriers remained legally obligated to update the old rates by
filing the new negotiated rates with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC or Commission).5 However, many carriers have inten-
1. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 1, 94 Stat. 793 (codi-
fied as amended at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10101-11917 (Law. Co-op.
1979 & Supp. 1989)). The author cites to U.S.C.S. to illustrate the state of the law
both before and after the 1980 Act. That is, provisions which remain unchanged are
cited to the 1979 bound volume, while a cite to the 1989 supplement indicates that a
change occurred in that provision pursuant or subsequent to regulatory reform.
2. A motor carrier in the context of this comment is an ICC-regulated motor
common carrier, or trucking company, engaged in the interstate transportation or
"carriage" of goods for hire via motor vehicles.
" '[Mlotor common carrier' means a person holding itself out to the general
public to provide motor vehicle transportation for compensation over regular or ir-
regular routes or both." 49 U.S.C.S. § 10102(14) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
A common carrier is "[olne who holds himself out to the public as engaged in
business of transportation of persons or property ... and who offers services to the
public generally." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 249 (5th ed. 1979).
For a discussion of motor carriers exempted from ICC regulation, see infra note
86.
3. Prior to regulatory reform in 1980, motor carriers generally adhered to the
rates set by regional rate bureaus and were exempt from antitrust liability for doing
so. See infra notes 90, 91, 102, & 103 and accompanying text. See, e.g., West, The
Challenge of the Eighties-What a Major Carrier Is Doing, TRAFFIC WORLD,July 1, 1985, at
50 (motor carrier which had filed less than 25 independent rates prior to 1980 filed
over 1,200 independent rates after regulatory reform).
4. A shipper in this context is an organization that "ships"-as either a sender
or receiver-materials, supplies, parts, products, or goods in interstate commerce via
motor carriers. See Star Line Trucking Corp. v. Department of Indus., Labor and
Human Relations, 109 Wis. 2d 266, 278, 325 N.W.2d 872, 878 n.10 (1982) ("term
'shipper' ... commonly understood to mean the owner or person for whose account
the carriage of goods is undertaken").
5. "A motor common carrier shall publish and file with the [Interstate Com-
merce] Commission tariffs containing the rates for transportation it may provide
under this subtitle." 49 U.S.C.S. § 10762(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
See § 10761 (a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989). For the text of this statute, see infra
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tionally, negligently, or otherwise failed to do So.6
As across-the-board rate discounting became the norm in the
newly competitive industry, numerous motor carriers found them-
selves unable to balance their accounts and have gone into bank-
ruptcy. 7 Months or years after negotiating the lower rates, many of
these carriers, or more often their bankruptcy trustees or freight rate
audit houses, have been re-billing shippers for the difference be-
tween the higher filed rates and the negotiated rates the carrier col-
lected but failed to file.8 All too often, shippers unwilling to pay
these undercharges9 have become defendants in suits brought for
their collection. 10
The practice of doing business at negotiated rates and then using
the filed rates as the basis for undercharge suits has created a conflict
between two provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA). I t
The first is the ICA's century-old "filed rate doctrine," which prohib-
its a carrier from collecting rates for its services different from those
6. For a discussion of the causes of the unfiled negotiated rates problem, see
infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of motor carrier bankruptcies in the 1980s, see infra notes
114-16 and accompanying text.
8. "[T]he auditors are continuing to grind [these bills] out like sausages ....
[Tihe shipping public looks on all this as the biggest legalized ripoff in the history of
regulated transportation-and as an enormous betrayal of trust as well." Bohman,
Getting off the Hook on Overcharges, TRAFFIC MGMr., August 1987, at 25. "[T]housands
of undercharge claims are under collection from scores of bankrupt carriers." ICC to
Move Against Phoney Undercharge Claims, PURCHASING, June 16, 1988, at 47.
9. "While there is no statutory definition of 'undercharge,' it results from the
application of a rate which makes charges less than those which were specified in the
tariff as legally applicable to the movement." Meiklejohn, Overcharges, Undercharges
and Reparations, 1975 TARIFFS, RATES AND PRACTICES-PART II 163, 165 (papers and
proceedings of the 1971 Transportation Law Institute).
10. Hundreds of negotiated rates undercharge suits have been filed since the
early 1980s. When combined with disputed undercharge claims that have not yet
found their way into court, the total value may amount to as much as $100 million.
MacDonald, ICC Action Adds New Spin to Ongoing Undercharge Contest, TRAFFIC MGMT.,
July 1989, at 15. "The balance-due bill situation has become a world-class mess.
How else to describe the spectacle of more than 1,700 undercharge suits being
dumped in one day on a U.S. Bankruptcy Court?" Quinn, Let's End the Balance-Due
Bill Blues, TRAFFIC MGMT., June 1988, at 11. For a discussion of the outcome of this
litigation, see infra notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
11. The present codification of the ICA is found at 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10701-11917
(Law Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989) (current version of An Act to Regulate Commerce,
ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887)). The 1887 Act, along with its amendments and recodifi-
cations, has long been popularly known as the Interstate Commerce Act. See, e.g.,
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Southern Pac. Co., 137 U.S. 48, 51 (1890). In 1920, Congress
formally changed the title to conform with this popular usage. Transportation Act of
1920, ch. 91, § 27, 41 Stat. 456, 499. Thus this comment will refer to the 1887 Act
and its later and current formulations as the Interstate Commerce Act or ICA.
1990]
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contained in tariffs filed with the ICC.12 The second is the ICA's
longstanding requirement that a carrier's practices be reasonable.13
At issue is whether the filed rate doctrine precludes the ICC from
finding under the ICA's reasonableness requirement that collection
of the filed rates would be an unreasonable practice.
The interpretation of these provisions in the era of reduced regu-
lation has become a hotly contested issue among shippers, motor
carriers, freight rate audit houses, bankruptcy trustees, Congress, the
courts, and the ICC. The ICC has declared that it has primary juris-
diction to determine the reasonableness of such billing practices,t4
that it may allow equitable defenses to the filed rate doctrine when
carriers have engaged in such practices,15 and that the collection of
undercharges would in most cases' 6 be an unreasonable practice
barred by the ICA. 17
As Congress considers a bill intended to unscramble the contro-
12. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10761(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979) (current version of Interstate
Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 6, 24 Stat. 379, 380-81 (1887)):
Except as provided under this subtitle, a carrier providing transporta-
tion or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission . . . shall provide that transportation or service only if the rate for
the transportation or service is contained in a tariff that is in effect under this
subchapter .... That carrier may not charge or receive a different compensation for
that transportation or service than the rate specified in the tariff whether by returning
a part of that rate to a person, giving a person a privilege, allowing the use
of a facility that affects the value of that transportation or service, or another
device.
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the origin and purpose of the filed rate doc-
trine, see infra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
13. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989) (current version of
the Mann-Elkin's Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 546 (1910)): "A rate .... classifica-
tion, rule, orpractice related to transportation or service provided by a carrier subject
to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... must be reasonable."
(emphasis added). For a discussion of the origins and purpose of the ICA's reasona-
bleness requirements, see infra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
14. National Indus. Transp. League-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Nego-
tiated Motor Common Carrier Rates (exparte No. MC-177), 5 I.C.C.2d 623, 624, 626-
27 (1989) [hereinafter Negotiated Rates II]. For a discussion of the ICC's primary
jurisdiction, see infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
15. National Indus. Transp. League-Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Nego-
tiated Common Carrier Rates (exparte No. MC-177), 3 I.C.C.2d 99, 99 (1986) [here-
inafter Negotiated Rates I] (when deciding on a case-by-case basis whether a carrier's
collection of undercharges would be an unreasonable practice, the ICC has con-
cluded that it has the authority to consider all circumstances, or equitable defenses,
surrounding the dispute). For a discussion of the rule against equitable defenses to
the rate filing requirements, see infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
16. As it has turned out, the ICC "has never seen a negotiated rate it didn't like."
Wastler, Commission Revises Policy on Negotiated Rates Cases, TRAFFIC WORLD, May 8,
1989, at 36 (quoting then-ICC Chairman Gradison).
17. See generally, Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at 99; Negotiated Rates II,
supra note 14, at 623; infra notes 120-48.
[Vol. 16
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versy,' 8 the courts remain deeply divided over the interpretation and
resolution of these issues. Courts in the majority ofjurisdictions re-
fer these disputes to the ICC, uphold the ICC's determination, allow
equitable defenses, and bar the collection of undercharges by hold-
ing that their collection would be unreasonable.19 A minority of
courts refuse to recognize the ICC's primary jurisdiction, holding
that even where a carrier conducted business at unfiled negotiated
rates, the filed rate doctrine strictly requires the collection of the
higher filed rate.2 0
18. For a discussion of the bill, see infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
19. The Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits agree that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction compels the courts within their jurisdictions to refer
such undercharge cases to the ICC and have held in favor of the shippers. See West
Coast Truck Lines v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 893 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1990); Delta Traffic
Serv. v. Appco Paper and Plastics Corp., 893 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1990) (ordering refer-
ral to ICC); Carrier's Traffic Serv. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 881 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.
1989); INF, Ltd. v. Spectro Alloys Corp., 881 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1989) (decided three
weeks after Maislin). See also Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635 (1 lth
Cir. 1986) (upholding the referral of railroad undercharge case involving an ambigu-
ous tariff to ICC and upholding ICC's decision to allow equitable defenses).
However, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have agreed to reconsider the issue.
See Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 708 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (referral to ICC denied), appeal docketed, No. 89-1329 (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 1989);
Feldspar Trucking Co. v. Greater Atlanta Shipper's Ass'n, 683 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (referral denied), interlocutory appeal denied, 849 F.2d 1389 (11 th Cir. 1988),
appeal docketed, No. 89-8450 (11 th Cir. June 9, 1989).
The First, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have cases pending. See Delta Traffic
v. Transtop, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1989) (referral denied; "[w]ithdrawn
from bound volume at request of the court"), argued, No. 89-1662 (1st Cir. Nov. 7,
1989); Branch Motor Express Co. v. Caloric Corp., No. 86-4850 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (re-
ferral granted), argued, No. 89-1330 (3d Cir. June 27, 1989); Cooper v. Delaware Val-
ley Shipper's Ass'n, No. SH-C-87-147 (W.D.N.C. April 19, 1989) (referral denied;
case dismissed), argued, No. 89-3259 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 1989); Orr v. Sewell Plastics,
Inc., 707 F. Supp. 967 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (referral granted), argued, No. 89-5108 (6th
Cir. Nov. 13, 1989).
20. The effect of such refusal is in most cases to deny referral to the ICC and to
allow recovery by the carrier. The Fifth Circuit stands alone among the circuits in
refusing to refer such cases to the ICC. See In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc.,
864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3006 (May 30, 1989)
(No. 88-1958); see also Delta Traffic Serv. v. Armstrong World Indus., 703 F. Supp.
525 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (shipper is held to the filed rate although the carrier "fraudu-
lently or negligently misrepresented the applicable rates and conducted business
with [the shipper] on the basis of the negotiated rates rather than on the rates actu-
ally on file"); Delta Traffic Serv. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 684 F. Supp. 769, 770 (D.
Conn. 1987) (referral to ICC denied; rule against equitable defenses enforced be-
cause the ICC has no primary jurisdiction where the question raised "is what the
appropriate tariff rates are"); Rebel Motor Freight, Inc. v. Southern Beverage Co.,
673 F. Supp. 785, 790 (M.D. La. 1987) (referral to ICC granted but not to review the
rule against equitable defenses because the ICC has no authority to waive the rule);
Sallee Horse Vans, Inc. v. Pessin, 763 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Ky. App. 1988) ("[T]he
courts clearly have no power to alter the terms of a duly published tariff of a common
19901
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted for the first
time with a post-regulatory reform undercharge case in Maislin Indus-
tries v. Primary Steel, Inc.21 The plaintiff-carrier in Maislin engaged in
the course of conduct followed by most carriers involved in negoti-
ated rates undercharge litigation. It vigorously competed for the
defendant-shipper's business by negotiating lower rates. It failed to
file those rates with the ICC, went bankrupt and allowed a freight
audit house to comb through its tariffs for the previous three years in
search of undercharges.22 It then attempted to recoup some of its
losses by twisting the filed rate doctrine to its advantage. 23 The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the decisions of the ICC and the district
court and held that the carrier was not entitled to recover the un-
dercharges.24 In so doing, the court reached a decision contrary to
that reached by the Fifth Circuit in In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo,
Inc. 25 and set the stage for the final settling of accounts by the United
States Supreme Court. 26
carrier."); G.M.W., Inc. v. Certified Parts Corp., 400 N.W.2d 512, 513 (Wis. App.
1986) ("The existence of a contract inconsistent with a filed ICC tariff and the car-
rier's intentional or negligent failure to file the contracted rate with the ICC are not
relevant.").
21. 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).
22. The current statute of limitations for over- and undercharge suits is three
years. 49 U.S.C.S. § 11706(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979). However, this period is sus-
pended for two years when the carrier files for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)
(1982). Thus audit houses may examine and bring claims for undercharges which
occurred up to three years prior to the time the carrier filed for bankruptcy. Since
most of these undercharge cases have arisen in bankruptcy, the carrier may have as
long as five years to bring suit. In re Total Transport, Inc., 87 Bankr. 568, 570 (D.
Minn. 1988) ("This adversary proceeding is one of over 50 similar proceedings ...
commenced by the trustee for [this carrier] against former customers which were
brought as a result of [an audit of the carrier's freight bills].") (emphasis added).
But see In re Rose Freight Lines, Inc., No. BKY 4-87-2990, slip op. at 1, 4 (Bankr.
D. Minn. Aug. 10, 1989). The court denied a bankruptcy trustee's request to employ
a freight bill audit house to examine the carrier's freight bills for the previous three
years in order to rebill and in some cases sue the shippers to collect the un-
dercharges. Id. The court stated: "While the debts may be legally due under the
statute, their collection after the customer has already paid an amount which it
agreed upon with the [carrier], is inherently unfair and does not reflect well on the
bankruptcy system." Id. at 3.
23. Plaintiff Maislin has brought similar undercharge suits against other shippers.
See, e.g., Maislin Indus. v. Auto Specialties Mfg., No. 85-0753-R (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
February 16, 1988); Maislin Transp. v. House of Wines, No. 84-2831 (D.D.C. June 2,
1987); In re Maislin Indus., 66 Bankr. 614 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Maislin Indus. v. Aj.
Hollander Co., 17 Colier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 454 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 15, 1986)
(proceeding against over 60 defendant-shippers); Maislin Indus. v. Packerland Pack-
ing Co., No. 85-CV-1851 (Cir. Ct. Wis. August 26, 1986).
24. Maislin, 879 F.2d at 401-06.
25. 864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989). See also infra notes 200-07 and accompanying
text.
26. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Maislin on January 16, 1990, 110 S.
[Vol. 16
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In the wake of these ICC policy revisions and conflicting court de-
cisions, a new basis for avoiding the strict application of the filed rate
doctrine in motor carrier undercharge cases has emerged: the nego-
tiated rates doctrine. The doctrine states: a motor common carrier
which (1) negotiates with a shipper a rate that the carrier represents
as, and the shipper reasonably believes is or will become the lawfully
filed rate, (2) fails, for whatever reason, to file the lower negotiated
rate with the ICC, (3) bills and accepts payment from the shipper at
the negotiated rate, and (4) later demands payment of the difference
between the filed rate and the negotiated rate, has engaged in an
unreasonable practice in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act
and is estopped from collecting any undercharges thus arising.
27
The purpose of this comment is to present and analyze the negoti-
ated rates doctrine as an appropriate solution to the current un-
dercharges conflict. The comment examines the issue in the context
of a decade-and century-in which fundamental changes have oc-
curred in the motor common carrier industry. In order to provide a
basic understanding of those changes, as well as a working knowl-
edge of the law involved, this comment explores the regulation of
the interstate transportation industry from the historical and statu-
tory perspective of the ICA.
The comment then traces and analyzes the trucking industry's reg-
ulation, from the appearance of the first motor trucks at the turn of
the century to federal regulation of the industry in 1935 to the indus-
try's partial deregulation forty-five years later. It then discusses the
causes of the current controversy and the attempts by the ICC, the
courts, and Congress to reinterpret the regulatory scheme in light of
the fundamental changes brought about by partial deregulation.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Maislin is examined in detail. Finally,
the comment explains the negotiated rates doctrine and suggests its
adoption as a solution to the problem which became the greatest
scourge to visit the American interstate surface transportation indus-
try in the 1980s.
Ct. 834 (1990), and heard oral arguments on April 16, 1990. The Court is expected
to issue its decision in the summer of 1990. See also Schulz, 'Classic' Undercharge Con-
flici Seen Headed For Supreme Court Decision, TRAFFIC WORLD, October 9, 1989, at 18-19.
"In sports, they were called 'classic confrontations.' ... In undercharges, it is the 8th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, St. Louis, v. the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
New Orleans.... You cannot read Supreme Beef and Maislin and come to the same
conclusion. They are diametrically opposite." Id.
27. For the full discussion of the author's formulation of the negotiated rates
doctrine, see infra notes 242-53 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 120-55
and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the doctrine).
1990]
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Reasonableness Requirement
1. Rates
Prior to the beginning of federal transportation regulation in
1887,28 the common law governed the activities of all common carri-
ers.29 Central to the common law was the requirement that carriers
charged shippers fair and reasonable rates. 30 Courts imposed liabil-
ity for damages on carriers who charged or collected unreasonable
rates.3'
In the age of unrestrained transportation competition during the
second half of the nineteenth century, carriers were free to discrimi-
nate among shippers by charging more favorable rates to some ship-
pers than to others.3 2 The consequence was a system of undue
28. See infra note 36.
29. See Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. 263, 275
(1892). The common law regulation of common carrier rates was premised on the
"doctrine that when private property was devoted to a public use, the public acquired
a right to the use upon reasonable terms." Hull, Reasonable Rates, 15 MICH. L. REV.
478, 479 (1917). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-30 (1876) (discussion of
common law origins of common carrier regulation); C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY ch. 3 (1969) (a thorough historical examination of duties owed to the pub-
lic by a common carrier-those engaged in a "common calling"-from early Roman
law to English common law to present American law); Brown, Antecedents of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, I I I.C.C. PRAC.J. 955, 955-57 (1944); Dempsey, Rate Regulation and
Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and Evolution of this Endangered Species, 32
AM. U.L. REV. 335, 335-36 (1983):
Transportation has been a fundamental element in the growth of civili-
zation and industrial development, and has had a profound effect on collec-
tive economic growth. Long ago, people recognized the essential role of
transportation and began to treat it differently from other industries,
thereby allowing the public interest to prevail over individual economic in-
terests. Traditionally the transportation industry has been deemed too im-
portant to be left to the vicissitudes of the marketplace.
30. See Southern Pac. v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 101 F. 779, 786 (8th Cir.
1900), appeal dismissed, 183 U.S. 695 (1901). Beyond the rate reasonableness require-
ment, the common law "demanded little more than that [common carriers] should
carry for all persons who applied ... in the order in which the goods were delivered
to the particular station." Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. at 275.
31. Southern Pac., 101 F. at 786. The carrier "may be called to account by the
shipper in an action at law for damages [where] any unreasonable or unjust rate or
charge is either exacted from the shipper or demanded." Id.
32. See Lundquist v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 121 F. 915 (C.C. Ill. 1901). "Under
the common law .... discrimination . . . was permitted to common carriers, inasmuch
as [they] were not under any obligation to treat all shippers alike. The carrier was
only required to make reasonable carrying charges to all." Id. H.B. FULLER, THE ACT
TO REGULATE COMMERCE CONSTRUED BY THE SUPREME COURT 59 (1915):
Although the weight of authority in this country favored the rule that
charges must be equal to all persons for the same services it was at least
doubtful whether the railroads were bound to this course and whether they
(Vol. 16
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preferences33 and unjust discrimination34 which resulted in the un-
fair and unreasonable treatment of disadvantaged shippers. Public
dissatisfaction with this arrangement and with the increasingly de-
structive competitive warfare among railroads convinced Congress
that federal regulation of interstate transportation was necessary. 35
With the enactment of the ICA,36 Congress expressly adopted
3 7
the common law prohibition against unreasonable rates by requiring
that interstate railroad charges be reasonable.38 Congress had two
might not charge one person more than another for either a similar or ex-
actly the same service.
33. Undue preference is an unfair advantage given by a carrier to one shipper
over another shipper. See Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. at 275.
34. Unjust or unreasonable discrimination is "a breach of the carrier's duty to
treat all shippers alike, and afford them equal opportunities to market their products.
A carrier's failure to treat all alike under substantially similar conditions." BLACK'S
LAW DIC'rIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979).
35. See Tollefson,Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commssion,
11 MINN. L. REV. 389, 389-92 (1927) (railroad abuses and competitive warfare re-
sulted in monopolies and rates that were unfair and discriminatory); Motor Carrier Act
of 1935: Hearings on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 1635 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1935) (ICC Commissioner Eastman: "unre-
strained competition led to all manner of unjust discriminations between shippers,
communities, and localities with the benefits going to the biggest"). See also H.B.
FULLER, supra note 32, at 59-60:
The evils which were naturally incident to a policy of unrestricted competi-
tion accumulated and suggested the necessity of some measure of legislative
control .... The inefficiency of [state laws designed to prevent discrimina-
tion] beyond the confines of the states because of constitutional limitations,
the manifest impossibility of securing concerted action by all legislatures
toward the regulation of traffic between and among- the various states, and
the growing abuses in railroad management and railroad transportation, all
combined to demonstrate the necessity for legislation by Congress to con-
trol the problem under its constitutional power to regulate commerce
among the several states.
36. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended
at 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10701-11917 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). Congress' au-
thority to. regulate interstate commerce is based on the commerce clause of the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power To...
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.").
Congress created the ICC, as the first federal regulatory agency, to implement
and enforce the provisions and policies of the ICA. "It became... necessary for the
legislative power to establish some one body with the power to determine the reason-
ableness of rates in order to do away with . . . confusion and to establish a uniform
standard-possessed of a jurisdiction broad enough to comprehend all such contro-
versies which might arise." H.B. FULLER, supra note 32, at 131. For a discussion of
the ICC's primary jurisdiction, see infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
37. See Tift v. Southern R.R., 123 F. 789, 792 (C.C. Ga.) (ICA "express adop-
tion" of common law principle which is "as old as the existence of common carriers,
to wit, that rates must be reasonable"), aft'd, 148 F. 1021 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 206 U.S.
428 (1903).
38. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 (1887) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1982)).
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main goals: to ensure for shippers "just and reasonable" transporta-
tion charges, 39 and to ensure the equality of rates.40 To that end,
Congress prohibited the railroads from unjustly discriminating
among shippers4l and from granting undue preferences to particular
39. Id. "All charges made for any service rendered or to be rendered in the trans-
portation of passengers or property..., or in connection therewith... shall be rea-
sonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for any such service is
prohibited and declared to be unlawful." Id. (emphasis added). The courts inter-
preted this section, as well as the common law, as limiting a carrier's charges to rates
which reasonably corresponded to the services provided by the carrier to the shipper.
"Reasonable compensation for the service actually rendered is all that the railroad is
permitted to exact." Tift, 138 F. at 753, 764. For a review of early ICC "just and
reasonable" interpretations, see Hull, supra note 29.
"As there is nothing in the act which defines what shall be held to be due or
undue, reasonable or unreasonable, such questions are questions, not of law, but of
fact." .New Haven R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 200 U.S. 361, 367 (1905).
See generally Walrath & Brown, Reasonableness of Motor Carrier Rates on Particular Move-
ments of Commodities, 1972 TARIFFS, RATES AND PRACTICES-PART I 403 (papers and
proceedings of the 1970 Transportation Law Institute); Note, The Shipper's Right to
Recoverfor Unreasonable Railroad Rates, 21 IowA L. REV. 751 (1936).
40.
[T]he great purpose of the act to regulate commerce, whilst seeking to pre-
vent unjust and unreasonable rates, was to secure equality of rates to all and
to destroy favoritism, these last being accomplished by requiring the publi-
cation of tariffs and by prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and
forbidding rebates, preferences and all other forms of undue discrimination.
New Haven R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 200 U.S. 361, 391 (1905). 'See alio
Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. 263 (1892); H.B.
FULLER, supra note 32, at 59-61 (discussion of ICA's purpose).
Congress designed the Act for the protection of shippers, Chicago, M., St. P. &
P. R.R. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 970, 974 (D. Ill. 1934), aff'd, 294 U.S. 499 (1935),
rather than for the benefit of carriers. Henwood v. McCallum & Robinson, Inc. 179
Tenn. 531, 536, 167 S.W.2d 981,983 (1943). See also Norman, Shipper's Remedy Under
the Motor Carrier Act When Charged an Unreasonable Rate By Carrier, 33 S.C.L. REV. 97,
102 (1959) (anti-discrimination provisions designed to protect shippers as
consumers).
41. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 2, 24 Stat. 379, 379-80 (1887) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10741(a)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1979)). The 1887 Act's anti-
discrimination provision provided: "[I]f any common carrier ... shall... receive...
a greater or less compensation ... than it charges ... any other ... for ... doing a
like . . . service[,] [that carrier is] guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby
prohibited and declared unlawful." Id. See 5. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess.
188-98 (1886) (discussion of railroad regulation in Europe and the need for anti-
discrimination controls). See also H.B. FULLER, supra note 32, at 178 (anti-discrimina-
tion provision derived from the English Railway Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845,
§ 90, known as the "equality clause"). See generally Goff, Discrimination, Preference, and
Prudice, 1975 TARIFFS, RATES AND PRACTICES-PART II 97 (papers and proceedings
of the 1971 Transportation Law Institute); Kline, The Origin of the Rule Against Unjust
Discrimination, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 123-56 (1917).
The current rule against discrimination states that an ICC-regulated carrier
,may not charge or receive . . . a different compensation (by using a special rate,
rebate, drawback, or other means) for a service rendered ... than it charges or re-
ceives from another person for performing a like and contemporaneous service ...
[Vol. 16
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In 1906, Congress amended the Act to preclude unreasonable car-
rier practices insofar as those practices affected rates.43 In so doing,
Congress expanded both the ICA's reasonableness requirement and
the ICC's power to determine the reasonableness of a carrier's prac-
tices. 44 With the Mann-Elkins Act in 1910, Congress firmly estab-
lished the reasonable practice requirement by giving the ICC
authority to enter orders regarding a carrier's practices, classifica-
tions, or regulations irrespective of whether they affected the carrier's
rates .45
The term "practice" was not defined in the amendment or in the
under substantially similar circumstances. A ... carrier [that does so] unreasonably
discriminates." 49 U.S.C.S. § 10741(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979).
To make out a case for a violation of the anti-discrimination provision, the com-
plainant, typically an aggrieved shipper, must show that: "1. A rate disparity exists; 2.
There is actual or potential competitive injury; 3. The defendant is the common
source of both the prejudicial and preferential rate; and 4. The rate disparity is not
justified by transportation conditions." Dresser Indus., Inc. v. I.C.C., 714 F.2d 588,
598 (5th Cir. 1983). The complainant has the burden to show the first three ele-
ments. The burden then shifts to the carrier to show that particular transportation
conditions justified its actions. Id. For example, "competition is a transportation
tondition justifying [an] otherwise unreasonable rate disparity." Id. at 599.
Finally, "[ilt should also be remembered that not all discriminations and prefer-
ences are unlawful, only those that are unjust or unreasonable." Goff, supra note 41,
at 107. For annotations of cases involving unjust discrimination, see Goff, supra note
41, at 108-12.
42. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 1074 1(a)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1979)). The rule against undue
preferences was modeled after the English Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 145 U.S. at 284; Linsenmeyer, Conduct of Suits to Recover Common
Carriers' Tariff Charges, 37 I.C.C. PR.c.J. 370, 371 (1970). For annotations of cases
involving undue preference, see Goff, supra note 41, at 112-15.
43. The Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906) (amending § 15)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10704(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979)): "[T]he com-
mission is authorized and empowered .... whenever.., it shall be of the opinion...
that any regulations or practices whatsoever of such carriers... affecting such rates...
are unreasonable.... to determine and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable
rate or rates." (emphasis added).
44. "One of the outstanding purposes of the creation of the commission was that
there might be established a body of experts to pass upon the reasonableness of
rates, practices, and charges." Tollefson, supra note 35, at 413 (emphasis added).
45. The Mann-Elkin's Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539 (1910) (amending § 1) (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989) and
10704(a)(1) (1979)). "[E]very such unjust and unreasonable classification, regulation,
and practice with reference to commerce between the States and with foreign coun-
tries is prohibited and declared to be unlawful." Id. at 546 (emphasis added).
"[W]henever... the commission shall be of opinion ... that any ... classifications,
regulations, or practices whatsoever of... [a] carrier. . . are ... unreasonable ... the
1990l
11
Chilstrom: The Negotiated Rates Doctrine [Maislin Industries v. Primary Stee
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
legislative history. The courts have interpreted the term to mean
something less than everything a carrier may do.46 For example,
while the term includes carrier routing practices,47 credit practices,48
and other procedures which may unreasonably and arbitrarily affect
a shipper,49 the ICC's unreasonable practice jurisdiction does not
extend to discretionary accounting methods employed by connecting
carriers when dividing fees.50
B. The Filed Rate Doctrine
1. The Rate Filing Requirements
As a means of facilitating the ICC's regulatory function, the ICA
stipulates that common carriers must publish their rates in tariffs and
file them with the ICC.5' Congress created this rate filing system to
be the starting point from which the ICC would execute the ICA's
goals of preventing unjust and unreasonable rates, securing equality
of rates, and eliminating discrimination and favoritism. Congress
commission is... empowered to determine and prescribe ... the just and reasonable
. . . rate or rates." Id. § 12, 36 Stat. at 551 (amending § 15) (emphasis added).
The current codification states: "A rate .... classification, rule, or practice related
to transportation or service provided by a carrier subject to the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission... must be reasonable." 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (emphasis added). "When the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ... decides ... that a classification, rule, or practice of that carrier [is unrea-
sonable] . . .. the Commission may prescribe the rate . . . classification, rule, or
practice to be followed." Id. § 10704(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979) (emphasis added).
The legislative history of the Mann-Elkin's Act reveals that Congress recognized
that the Act would "'much enlarge[ ]'" the jurisdiction of the ICC. United States v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 242 U.S. 208, 228 (1916) (citation omitted). More recently, the
ICC has reiterated its "significant responsibility to eliminate illegal practices which are
damaging to the transportation industry, its users, individual consumers, and the
communities involved." Franzen, Enforcing a Cartek. A Study of the ICC and the Motor
Carrier Industty, 11 Sw. U.L. REV. 597, 613 (1979) (quoting 1972 ICC ANN. REP. 64)
(emphasis added).
46. " 'Practice' as employed in the statute cannot have a meaning co-extensive
with any exigency deemed to exist, or elastic enough to embrace everything a carrier
may do." Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D. Minn. 1941).
Rather, courts have limited their interpretation of the term by reasoning that the
proximity of the term "practices" to the terms "classifications" and "regulations"
"was intended to confine it to acts or conduct having the same purpose as its associ-
ates." United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 242 U.S. 208, 229 (1916).
47. See Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 87 (1962).
48. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336 (1982).
49. The term "practice" as used in the Act "embrace[s] those things that affect
arbitrarily and unreasonably the purse of the shipper.... The prime solicitude of the
Interstate Commerce Act is the protection of passengers, shippers, and consignees."
Northern Pac. R.R., 41 F. Supp. at 443 (emphasis added).
50. Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. United States, 277 U.S. 291, 300 (1928).
51. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10762(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989). For the text of
the statute, see supra note 5.
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reasoned that these goals could best be realized if the ICC was first
made aware of and given the power to approve or reject the rates
carriers charged shippers and the practices in which carriers
engaged.52
In addition, and most critically, once a carrier has made such a
filing, "[t]hat carrier may not charge or receive a different compensa-
tion for that transportation or service than the rate specified in the
tariff [filed with the ICC]."53 For over a century this portion of the
ICA has remained substantially unchanged.54 It has become one of
the primary mechanisms by which the ICC and the courts enforce the
policies of the ICA.55 Coupled with the rule against equitable de-
52. See, e.g., New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 200
U.S. 361, 391 (1906) (ICA's goals achieved "by requiring publication of tariffs and by
prohibiting secret departures from such tariffs, and forbidding rebates, preferences,
and all other forms of undue discrimination"); Kansas City S. R.R. v. C.H. Albers
Comm'n Co., 223 U.S. 573, 597 (1912) (ICA's goals achieved through the filing and
publication of rates, the inflexibility of rates while in force, and the unalterability of
rates except by prescribed mode). See also S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 200
(1886). The ICC and the filing requirements were created "with the... purpose of
securing publicity... [so] that it can focus public attention on the individual abuses
[of carriers]." Id.
53. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10761(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979). For the text of this statute, see
supra note 12.
54. The original version stated:
And when any such common carrier shall have established and pub-
lished its rates, fares, and charges in compliance with the provisions of this
section, it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand,
collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensa-
tion for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any service in
connection therewith, than is specified in such published schedule of rates,
fares, and charges as may at [he time be in force.
Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall file with
the Commission hereinafter provided for copies of its schedules of rates,
fares, and charges which have been established and published in compliance
with the requirements of this section, and shall promptly notify said Com-
mission of all changes made in the same.
Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104 § 6, 24 Stat. 379, 381 (1887) (current version at 49
U.S.C.S. § 10761(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979)).
55. Throughout the past century the federal courts have consistently and strictly
enforced the ICA's rate filing requirements. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. Burke, 255
U.S. 317, 319 (1921); Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. R.R. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577, 581
(1919); Erie R.R. v. Stone, 244 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1917); New York, Cent. & H. R.
R.R. v. Gray, 239 U.S. 583, 585-86 (1916); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati,
N.O. & Tex. Pac. R.R., 239 U.S. 446, 451 (1915).
"A carrier cannot waive or modify legally applicable tariffs .... and individual
hardship is not a defense to the application of such tariffs." Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v.
Golden Triangle Wholesale Gas Co., 586 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978). The pur-
pose of the filed rate doctrine is "to preserve the integrity of filed rates." Bowser &
Campbell v. Knox Glass, Inc., 390 F.2d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 1968). "[T]he provisions of
the tariff, as published, are binding upon both the shipper and the carrier as a matter
of law." Glickfeld v. Howard Van Lines, Inc., 213 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1954).
" 'Until changed tariffs bind both carriers and shippers with force of law.' " Crancer
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fenses, it has come to be known as the filed rate doctrine.56
2. The Rule Against Equitable Defenses
In order to execute the policies of the ICA, the United States
Supreme Court adopted a strict construction of the rate filing re-
quirements. Because equitable defenses would controvert the strict
v. Lowden, 121 F.2d 645, 650 (8th Cir. 1941) (quoting Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-
Lonsdale Grain Co., 306 U.S. 516, 520 (1939)).
State courts have long and strictly enforced the ICA's rate filing requirement as
well. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Stannard, 99 Kan. 720, 723, 162 P. 1176,
1177 (1917); American Ry. Express v. Mohawk Dairy Co., 250 Mass. 1, 2, 144 N.E.
721, 723 (1924); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marcelletti, 256 Mich. 411, 411, 240 N.W. 4, 4
(1932); Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R.R. v. Reeves Coal Co., 148 Minn. 196,
198-99, 181 N.W. 335, 336 (1921); Foster Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
270 Mo. 629, 636-38, 194 S.W. 281, 286-87 (1917); Wall v. Northern Pac. Ry., 53
Mont. 81, 87, 161 P. 518, 521 (1916); Central R.R. v. Mauser, 241 Pa. 603, 604-05,
88 A. 791, 792-93 (1913); Hardaway v. Southern R.R., 90 S.C. 475, 478, 73 S.E.
1020, 1021 (1912); Melody v. Great Northern Ry., 25 S.D. 606, 607, 127 N.W. 543,
544 (1910).
In addition, many states incorporated similarly-enforced rate filing requirements
into their own regulations regarding intrastate transportation. See, e.g., Emerson v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 196 Ala. 280, 284, 72 So. 120, 122 (1916) (rates to be filed with
the Alabama Railroad Commission); Coon Valley Gravel Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
R.R., 241 Iowa 487, 489, 41 N.W.2d 676, 677-78 (1950) (rates to be filed with the
Iowa State Commerce Commission); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Queenan, 102 Neb. 391,
395-96, 167 N.W. 410, 411-12 (1918) (rates to be filed with the Nebraska Railway
Commission); Purcell v. New York Cent. R.R., 268 N.Y. 164, 164, 197 N.E. 182, 182
(1935) (filing to be made with the New York Public Service Commission), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 545 (1935).
Other federal regulatory agencies strictly observe rate filing requirements as
well. See, e.g., Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (d) (1988): "Unless the [Federal
Energy Regulatory] Commission otherwise orders, no change shall be made by any
natural-gas company in any [filed] rate, charge, classification, or service ... except
after thirty days notice." See also Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 831
F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (enforcing the Natural Gas Act's filed rate doctrine) reh'g
denied, 844 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See generally Watkiss, Deregulatory Myopia: Sacri-
ficing the Filed Rate Doctrine and Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking to Promote Competition
in Gas Markets, 42 Sw. L. J. 711 (1988); Note, FERC Waiver of the Filed Rate Doctrine:
Some Suggested Principles, 9 ENERGY L. REV. 497, 506 (1988) (discussion of "six interre-
lated elements which have been used to decide whether the [FERC's] filed rate doc-
trine should be waived").
56. As commonly formulated, the filed rate doctrine "forbids a regulated entity
to charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate
federal regulatory authority." Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577
(1981) (enforcing the Natural Gas Act's filed rate doctrine). While the Supreme
Court's decisions prior to 1980 "established rather clear contours for the doctrine,"
the Court used the term "filed rate doctrine" for the first time in Arkansas Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 599 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally
Robinson, The Filed Rate in Public Utility Law: A Study in MechanicalJurisprudence Law, 77
U. PA. L. REV. 213, 231-254 (1928) (filed rate doctrine's origins, purpose, and early
application). See also Linsenmeyer, supra note 42, at 370-77 (how to bring an un-
dercharge suit based upon the filed rate doctrine).
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enforcement of these policies, their admission in suits brought to en-
force the collection of the filed rate has generally been forbidden.57
In its often-quoted 1915 formulation of the filed rate doctrine, the
Court allows only one exception:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the rate of the carrier duly
filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted
upon any pretext. Shippers and travelers are charged with notice
of it, and they as well as the carrier must abide by it, unless it is found
by the Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquotation of
rates is not an excuse for paying or charging either less or more
than the filed rate. This rule is undeniably strict and it obviously
may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which
has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate com-
merce in order to prevent unjust discrimination.5 8
57. "[W]here the [purpose of the suit] is to collect from a shipper the legal, pre-
scribed rate for the service rendered, equitable principles play no part." Central R.R.
v. Mauser, 241 Pa. 603, 604, 88 A. 791, 792 (1913). "[T]he federal courts will permit
no defense to an action instituted by a common carrier [to recover the filed rate],
provided such defense presents a possible method by which the terms of the inter-
state commerce law may be evaded." Louisville & N. R.R. v. McMullan, 5 Ala. App.
662, 667, 59 So. 683, 684 (1912). See generally Kenworthy, Carrier's Duty to Collect Full
Applicable Tariff Rate, 37 DICTA 289 (1960). "Probably the most inflexibly applied
duty known to current law is the duty of a carrier to collect the full applicable tariff
rate." Id. at 289.
Thus, a majority of courts generally dismiss shippers' counterclaims as well. See,
e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Marcelletti, 256 Mich. 411,412, 240 N.W. 4, 5 (1932) (ship-
per's counterclaim in undercharge suit barred by policies of courts and ICA requiring
strict application of filed rate). See also F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D.C.
Ry., 149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945). The courts reason that "[t]he [carrier] ... as one
who was conclusively presumed and legally bound to know the [filed] rate, cannot be
heard to say that it was deceived or damaged by false representations about the
[filed] rate." Id. at 910.
In the typical counterclaim, the shipper seeks to argue that the common law
principles of negligence and misrepresentation should operate to hold the carrier
liable for any undercharges where the carrier agreed but failed to file a negotiated
rate. See Bowser & Campbell'v. Knox Glass, Inc., 390 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1968). In
Knox Glass, a shipper unsuccessfully sought to circumvent the filed rate doctrine by
"reasoning ... that the [carrier's] failure to file the rate agreed on with the shipper
amounted to a breach of contract for which the damages are to be measured at pre-
cisely the amount of the undercharges." Id. at 197.
Such a counterclaim was recently allowed for the first time by a court which held
that "permitting defendants to maintain a cause of action in negligence would not,
under every set of facts defendants might possibly make out, lead to a result inconsis-
tent with the results of the Motor Carrier Act." Coliseum Cartage Co. v. Continental
Coffee Products, Inc., No. 88-347, slip op. at 9 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 1989). See also
Murphy, First Undercharge Counterclaim Allowed in Federal Court Suit, TRAFFIC WORLD,
April 3, 1989, at 8.
58. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915). Accord Arkan-
sas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1980) (quoting and applying the
Maxwell court's filed rate doctrine); Davis v. Akron Feed & Milling Co., 296 F. 675,
677 (6th Cir. 1924) ("[A]ny other construction [of the filed rate doctrine] would de-
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The rule against equitable defenses is based upon the same over-
riding policies as the rate filing requirements: the assurance of uni-
form rates and the prevention of discrimination and its destructive
effects. The rule is commonly justified on the grounds that such de-
fenses would operate to circumvent the filing requirements and thus,
the anti-discrimination policies behind them.59
feat the purpose of the act... and would afford opportunity for collusion and fraud
between the carrier and favored shippers, to the injury and prejudice of the public.").
The highlighted phrase is the exception to the doctrine's strict application. See
Pumice Aggregate Sales Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,'277 ICC 351, 355 (1950)
(since the carrier's practice of charging for transportation at closed car rather than
open-top car rates as specified by shipper was unreasonable, shipper authorized to
waive the undercharges); Jasper Novelty Furniture Co. v. Southern Ry., 272 I.C.C.
513, 517 (1948) (undercharges waived where "unforeseen events wholly beyond the
control of any of the parties" (a strike) would make the application of the filed rate
unreasonable). See also Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Campbell Soup Co., 455 F.2d
1219 (8th Cir. 1972). Allowing consignee's defenses to the filed rate doctrine "will
not erode the purpose underlying [the doctrine] as long as the grounds for estoppel
do not serve directly or indirectly as a cover for freight rate discrimination." Id. at
1222. Additional examples of the application of the unreasonableness exception may
be found in Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 1 I.C.C.2d 767, 772
(1985).
In 1903, the Elkins Act criminalized any deviation from the filed rate by subject-
ing both carriers and shippers to misdemeanor prosecution for charging or paying a
rate other than that filed with the ICC. Act of February 19, 1903, ch. 708, § 1, 32
Stat. 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 11703, 11902-11903,
11915-11916 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). The policy behind the Elkins Act is
to ensure equality of rates by requiring "that the only rate charged to any shipper for
the same service under the same conditions should be the [filed rate]. [T]he inten-
tion was to prohibit any and all means that might be resorted to obtain or receive
concessions and rebates from the fixed rates." Armour Packing Co. v. United States,
209 U.S. 56, 72 (1908).
Any deviation from the filed rate is now a felony, currently the only felony provi-
sion in the entire ICA. 49 U.S.C.S. § 11903(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
See, e.g., United States v. Atchison, T., & S.F. R.R., 725 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir. 1980)
(criminal liability imposed under the Elkins Act where carrier failed to strictly abide
by the terms of the filed rates); United States v. Duncan Ceramics, Inc., 544 F. Supp.
1297, 1303 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (The issue of whether undercharges could be collected
from the shipper is irrelevant and "does not absolve [the carrier] from criminal liabil-
ity for charging rates based on services it could not legally provide."). See generally,
Goodman, Agency Policymaking Beyond the Law: The New Exemptions From Criminal Prosecu-
tion at the ICC, 54 TRANSP. PRAC.J. 377 (1987) (discussion of the ICA's criminal penal-
ties past, present, and future).
59. "If the rates are subject to secret alteration by special agreement then the
[ICA] will fail of its purpose to establish a rate duly published, known to all, and from
which neither shipper nor carrier may depart." Armour Packing Co. v. United States,
209 U.S. 56, 81 (1908). "Otherwise the primary purpose of the [ICA]-to obtain
equal treatment of all shippers and the enforcement of one rate [for] all-would be
defeated by a multiplicity of oral agreements for the carriage of goods at rates differ-
ent from those set forth in the published tariffs." H.B. FULLER, supra note 32, at
278-79.
Obviously it would be virtually impossible to prove that a carrier would not
[Vol. 16
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Those who favor an interpretation of the ICA which would allow
courts to consider equitable defenses-such as ignorance or mis-
quotation of rates-reason that it is unfair or "inequitable" for the
filed rate doctrine to force a shipper to pay a higher rate where a
carrier misquoted a lower rate upon which the shipper relied. In the
typical undercharge suit, the shipper argues that the "inequity" re-
sults when a carrier is allowed to hide behind the filed rate doctrine
and collect the higher filed rate when the carrier did business at
lower negotiated rates and agreed to file them but failed to do so. 60
The courts, however, have not been particularly concerned with
balancing the equities between individual carriers and shippers.61
Instead, courts have based the strict application of the filed rate doc-
trine on two fundamental concepts. First, because shippers are
charged with constructive knowledge of the filed rate, they are con-
clusively presumed to know that rate.62 Second, when the ICC has
approved the reasonableness of a filed rate, that rate is the legal rate
and has the force of statute. 63
offer similar rates to other shippers similarly situated. Hence, the [common
law] offered no protection to the shipper against discrimination. Cast in this
background the rigidity of the present rule that the carrier must collect the
full applicable tariff rate becomes excusable.
Kenworthy, supra note 57, at 292.
60. In the current undercharge controversy, however, the ICC reasons that the
use of the term "equitable defense" to describe such arguments has become a misno-
mer because shippers' defenses to claims brought to collect the filed rate are based
on a statute, on the reasonableness requirement of 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a), rather than
on principles of equity. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 627-28. See infra notes
206-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implications of this interpreta-
tion. For a thorough discussion of the traditional rule against equitable defenses to
undercharge claims, see Comment, Right of Interstate Carrier to Collect Undercharges, 45
YAL L.J. 142 (1935).
61. The duty embodied in the filed rate doctrine "is not to be measured . . . by
the apparent equities between the carrier [and the shipper. Rather, it] is a duty owed
likewise to the public in order to prevent discrimination and the damage which dis-
crimination can inflict." Southern Ry. v. Mayer Meyers Paper Co., 191 Tenn. 164,
171, 232 S.W.2d 20, 23 (1950).
62. See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 652-53 (1913).
63. "A tariff which is filed, approved and published in accordance with the Inter-
state Commerce Act has the force and effect of a statute." United States v. United
States Steel Corp., 645 F.2d 1285, 1290 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Armour Packing
Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 81 (1908)).
However, an inquiry into the applicable rate does not end there. Most courts use
the Maxwell exception to the filed rate doctrine found to make the important distinc-
tion between the legal rates, those that have the "force of statute," and. the lawful
rates, those that are reasonable per 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a). The "rate which is filed
with the Commission is not ipso facto a lawful rate. It is the applicable rate which the
carrier must . . . charge to shippers in the regular course of business .... [M]erely
because the carrier is bound to charge the filed rate, it does not follow that he is
necessarily entitled to keep it." Middlewest Motor Freight v. United States, 433 F.2d
212, 238 (8th Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 999 (1971).
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According to this reasoning, it is irrelevant whether the carrier ac-
ted dishonestly or in bad faith.64 It is also irrelevant whether the
shipper was ignorant of the filed rate,6 5 or had relied to its detriment
upon the carrier's representations regarding that rate. 66 As a result,
courts have routinely nullified contracts6 7 and other agreements
"[T]he legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate-it was lawful only if it was
reasonable. Under [the ICA], the shipper [is] bound to pay the legal rate; but, if he
[can] show that it was unreasonable, he might recover reparation." Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932). "Thus a legal rate... may
at the same time be unlawful because it is preferential, discriminatory, unjust or un-
reasonable." Meiklejohn, supra note 9, at 164.
64. "Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable rate
will bind the carrier or shipper" to any rate other than the filed rate. Kansas City S.
Ry., 227 U.S. at 653. "Should the carrier's agent intentionally or unintentionally
grant the shipper a lower freight rate than the tariff requires, the carrier may collect
this undercharge or rebate from the shipper." St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Pollard, 202 Ark.
917, 918, 154 S.W.2d 9, 10 (1941).
65. See, e.g., Union Transfer Co.. v. Renstrom, 151 Neb. 326, 329, 37 N.W.2d 383,
385 (1949).
66. "Ordinary principles of estoppel do not apply to a carrier's right to collect
the approved published tariff rate even in cases where the carrier has knowingly
quoted an illegally low rate and the shipper ... has innocently relied on such quota-
tion, without inquiry or investigation, to its later detriment." Hughes Transp., Inc. v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 212, 235 (Cl. Ct. 1954). "To permit an estoppel ...
would permit favoritism and discrimination .... The lawful rate must be collected."
Kansas Elec. Power Co. v. Thomas, 123 Kan. 321, 325, 255 P. 33, 35 (1927). But see
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 74-76 (1956) (estoppel available to
federal government as shipper-defendant); Griffin Grocery Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
93 Ga. App. 546, 550, 92 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1956) (carrier estopped from charging
filed rate in non-undercharge case where anti-discrimination policy would not be
controverted).
67.
[Most] [t]ransportation contracts ... are fundamentally different from
the ordinary contract in that the respective duties of the contracting parties
are carefully defined by statute, and their rights-indeed, their very freedom
to contract in certain respects-are strictly limited by those statutes regard-
less of the parties' knowledge of those restrictions or of their manifest desire
to contract otherwise.
Hughes Transp., Inc., 121 F. Supp. at 228 (footnote omitted).
See also New York Cent. & H.R. R.R. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 406, 408
(1921) (parties powerless to agree to a rate lower than the filed rate). "The broad
purpose of the [Interstate] Commerce Act was to compel the establishment of rea-
sonable rates and their uniform application. That purpose would be defeated if sanc-
tion be given to a special contract by which any such advantage is given to a
particular shipper .... " Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 166 (1912).
See also Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242 (1906) (parties bound by filed rate
rather than negotiated rate appearing in bill of lading).
Cf Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981) (citations
omitted):
[U]nder the [FERC's] filed rate doctrine, when there is a conflict between
the filed rate and the contract rate, the filed rate controls .... [T]o permit
parties to vary by private agreement the rates filed with the Commission
would undercut the clear purpose of the congressional scheme: granting the
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which specified a rate different from the filed rate even when the car-
rier's failure to file the negotiated rate was due to its mistake, negli-
gence,6 8 or fraud.69
C. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was developed by the United
States Supreme Court and allows the ICC to interpret and harmo-
nize the competing demands of the ICA, including the sometimes
conflicting exigencies of the reasonableness requirements and the
filed rate doctrine.70 In general, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
requires a court to refer the interpretation of certain issues to the
administrative agency created by Congress to regulate and resolve
Commission the opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of
the rate. .
But see Exemption of Motor Contract Carriers from Tariff Filing Requirements
(ex parte No. MC- 165), 133 M.C.C. 150 (1983) [hereinafter Contract Carrier Exemp-
tion], in which the ICC exempted contract carriers from the tariff filing requirements
the ICA, and thus from the operation of the filed rate doctrine. For a discussion of
the exemption's broad implications in the current undercharges controversy, see in-
fra note 106.
68. See, e.g., New York Cent. &H.R. R.R., 256 U.S. at 407-08 (irrelevant that ship-
per would not have shipped with carrier but for the rates carrier mistakenly quoted
and charged); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Fink, 250 U.S. 577 (1919) (shipper
and carrier mistake as to applicable rate absolved neither from their respective duties
to remit and collect the filed rate); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226
U.S. 441 (1913) (carrier has a right and duty to collect the higher rate notwithstand-
ing its mistake); Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Greenberg, 139 Minn. 428, 166 N.W.
1073 (1918) (shipper liable for the higher, filed rate where shipper relied on the
lower rate mistakenly published in carrier's bill of lading).
69. See, e.g., F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D. C. Ry., 149 F.2d 909 (8th
Cir. 1945) (purchaser bound to filed rate even where carrier and shipper conspired to
erroneously classify shipment at lower rate); Graves Truck Line v. Hy Plains Dressed
Beef, Inc., 204 Kan. 275, 462 P.2d 130 (1969) (shipper must pay filed rate even
where carrier's agents misrepresented that rate).
70. In the 1887 Act, Congress conferred jurisdiction over disputes involving
ICC-regulated carriers upon both the courts and the ICC. Interstate Commerce Act,
ch. 104, § 9, 24 Stat. 379, 382 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10705(c)(1)
(Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). However, the Supreme Court interpreted the
ICA as requiring an initial determination by the ICC when the suit involves an inter-
pretation of the reasonableness of a carrier's rates or practices. "[A] shipper seeking
reparation predicated upon the unreasonableness of the established rate must, under
the [ICA], primarily invoke redress through the [ICC], which body alone is vested with
power originally to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an established sched-
ule ...." Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). This has
come to be known as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. "The doctrine originated
with Mr. Justice (later ChiefJustice) White in Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co." United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 346 (1959) (citation
omitted). Thus it was "by judicial legislation, [that the Court] gave practical effect to
the intent of Congress to make the... [ICC] the agency for the determination of the
reasonableness of rates." Miller, The Necessity for Preliminary Resort to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 1 GEo.WASH. L. REV. 49, 58-59 (1932) (footnote omitted).
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those issues.T1 Issues properly referred include those not within a
court's conventional knowledge and those which require the unique
competence of an administrative agency.72
Primary jurisdiction enables an administrative agency such as the
ICC to ensure the uniform treatment of regulated entities by mini-
mizing conflicts between that agency and the courts. With primary
jurisdiction, that administrative agency can better utilize its special
knowledge, experience, and expertise to execute the administrative
policy which Congress has entrusted to it.Ta
Issues of fact which require the ICC's discretion and expertise in
technical matters must be referred to the ICC.74 Since reasonable-
ness determinations characteristically require a knowledge of trans-
portation regulation and involve extensive and conflicting evidence,
and since only the ICC possesses such knowledge and capabilities, a
court must submit such questions to the ICC's primary jurisdiction.
Thus "[w]henever a rate, rule or practice is attacked as unreasonable
or as unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to the
Commission." 75
71.
"Primary Jurisdiction,"... . applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim re-
quires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a
case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views.
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
72. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a
particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the
judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertain-
ing and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained
through experience, and by more flexible procedure.
Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
73. "[T]o permit separate suits and separate findings ... would bring about di-
rect conflict in the administration of the law." Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 259 (1913).
For if, without previous action by the Commission, power might be exerted
by courts and juries generally to determine the reasonableness of an estab-
lished rate, it would follow that unless all courts reached an identical conclu-
sion a uniform standard of rates in the future would be impossible, as the
standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the divergent conclu-
sions reached as to reasonableness by the various courts called upon to con-
sider the subject as an original question.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. at 440-41.
See also In re Long Distance Telecommunication Litig., 612 F. Supp. 892 (D.C.
Mich. 1985). The ICC has primary jurisdiction where "there exists a danger of in-
consistent rulings disruptive of a statutory scheme." Id. at 896.
74. See Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922). "[Iln
such [cases] the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its views." Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. at 63-64.
75. Great N. Ry., 259 U.S. at 291:
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A court has traditionally had the prerogative to adjudicate a case
without initial reference to the ICC only if the ICC's expertise and
discretion would not be helpful. Such disputes often involve varia-
tions from a carrier's filed rate because the ICC's expertise and dis-
cretion is not commonly required where a rate has been filed with
and approved by the ICC.76 In the past, undercharge suits typically
involved nothing more than the construction or application of a rate
or tariff. Thus most courts have customarily held that preliminary
reference to the ICC in such cases is unnecessary.77
Once a court has deferred to the ICC's primary jurisdiction, the
ICC may conduct an investigation, hold hearings, and make findings
of fact. The ICC will ultimately issue a decision to the referring
court. 78 However, an opinion rendered by the ICC is merely advi-
sory, and the referring court has the discretion to accept or reject all
or part of it.79 Nevertheless, ICC decisions will not "be lightly dis-
[This] is required because the enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discre-
tion in technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determi-
nation is left to the Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached
ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate ap-
preciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation
is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a
body of experts.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized, in a 1934 case, that issues involv-
ing "published rates and practices alleged to be unjust and unreasonable in them-
selves, and unjust, unreasonable, and discriminatory in relation to others, [are] not
... for the courts, but for the Commission." Carrollton Excelsior & Fuel Co. v. New
Orleans & N.E. R.R., 69 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 1934).
For annotations of rate reasonableness cases subject to the ICC's primary juris-
diction, see 49 U.S.C.S. § 11705 nn.48 & 50 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989). For
annotations of unreasonable practice cases subject to the ICC's primary jurisdiction,
see id. & n.53.
76. See Miller, supra note 70, at 62-64. A rate or provision contained in a filed
tariff and approved by the ICC is "to be treated as though it ... [is] a statute, binding
as such upon... [carrier] and shipper alike." Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal
Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197 (1912). However, the filing of a particular rate does
not preclude relief from that rate if it is later found by the ICC to be unreasonable
and hence unlawful.
77. But see Meiklejohn, supra note 9, at 167: "The line between the interpretation
problem which may be resolved by the court and the one which must be referred to
the Commission is incapable of precise delineation." The general rule against the
referral of undercharges is "limited to those involving no question of fact or of ad-
ministrative discretion." Miller, supra note 70, at 74 (footnote omitted).
78. See 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10321-10330 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
79. 28 U.S.C. 1336(b) (1982):
When a district court or the United States Claims Court refers a ques-
tion or issue to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination, the
court which referred the question or issue shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of a civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or
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turbed"80 and are generally given "great deference"81 unless con-
trary to law.
8 2
D. Regulation and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
Prior to 1935,83 there was virtually no federal regulation8 4 of mo-
tor vehicle transportation, and only scattered state regulation.85 As
amended by the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Congress ex-
tended the regulations of the ICA to include transportation by com-
mon motor carriers involved in interstate commerce.86 Congress
intended to restrict competition between motor carriers and the rail-
roads, to limit competition among motor carriers, and to ensure ade-
quate and safe service at reasonable rates.8 7
80. Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 40 F.2d 921, 923 (W.D. Pa. 1930).
81. Franzen, supra note 45, at 615.
82. The authority to enjoin or set aside orders of the ICC is "confined to deter-
mining whether there ha[ve] been violations of the Constitution, or of the power
conferred by statute, or an exercise of power so arbitrary as virtually to transcend the
authority conferred." Kansas City S. Ry. v. United States, 231 U.S. 423, 440 (1913).
See generally TollefsonJudicial Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 503 (1937); Tollefson, supra note 35.
83. The first trucks appeared on the American market in about 1900. Four hun-
dred and ten trucks were registered in 1904. By 1934, about 3,500,00 trucks were
registered. Although most were in private use, common carriers operated 25,000
trucks in 1926, "and the number grew rapidly thereafter." Dively, Applications of Reg-
ulatory Theory to the Trucking Industry, 6 REs. L. & ECON. 211, 212-18 (1984).
84. In 1906, Congress expanded the ICA's regulations to include the activities of
express companies engaged in interstate transit. These regulations extended to mo-
tor vehicles owned by these companies. Act ofJune 29, 1906, ch. 3591, § 1, 34 Stat.
584 (1906).
85. See generally Stecker, A Review of Common Carrier Motor Vehicle Regulation, 6
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1931) (summary of state motor carrier regulation from 1910 to
1931); George, Regulation of Motor Carrier Service and Rates, 3 U. CIN. L. REV. 269
(1929) (review of intrastate regulation).
86. Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, §§ 201-227, 49 Stat. 543, 543-67 (1935)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10101-11917 (Law. Co-
op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). Exempted from regulation were carriers of agricultural
products, private carriers, and others. Id. § 203(b), 49 Stat. at 545 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10526 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). Thus only
about half the trucking industry became subject to regulation under the Act.
87. Id. § 202, 49 Stat. at 543 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10101 (Law.
Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). Commentators generally agree that the primary intent
of a Congress grappling with the negative effects of the Depression upon the rail-
roads was to limit competition between motor carriers and the railroads. See, e.g.,
Franzen, supra note 45, at 600-01; Note, Federal Motor Carrier Act, 36 COLUM. L. REV.
945, 947 & n.15 (1936);Jacobs, Regulated Motor Carriers and the Antitrust Laws, 58 COR-
NELL L. REV. 90, 91 (1972):
[In the 1930s,] the ICC faced the phenomenon of a new, fast, flexible alter-
native for the movement of [short-haul and other goods] by truck. It was
clearly in the interest of the Commission and its rail protectorate to secure
the regulation of motor carriers as long as railroads had to operate with
politically dictated rates that did not reflect cost-of-service pricing.
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Under the 1935 Act, the interstate trucking industry became one
of the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy. Entry was
tightly controlled and the industry became highly concentrated. 88
Carriers were required to file proposed rate changes at least thirty
days before the new rates were to become effective. 8 9 Those rates
were rigorously administered and enforced by the ICC.
Since private rate bureaus allowed truckers to collectively fix rates
without fear of antitrust liability,90 few carriers exercised their pre-
rogative to set and file new rates. They instead relied upon the rate
bureaus to print, distribute, and file the tariffs established by the
group. Thus, prior to 1980, ICC-regulated motor carriers had no
use for free market theories or practices. 9 1 Consequently, they had
little if any experience establishing and implementing new rates and
dealing with the rigors of competition in a free market.
E. Partial Deregulation and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
By the late 1970s, a combination of forces culminated in the partial
88. Upon passage of the Act in 1935, "only 18,000 out of 90,000 motor carrier
'grandfather' applications were granted. Entry control was further tightened, until
by 1977 the number had been reduced to but 15,000.... In 1972 the top eight firms
had seventeen percent of the trucking business, and a quarter of all income." Hard-
away, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning the Tide, 14 TRANSP. L. J. 101,
127 (1985).
89. Motor Carrier Act, 1935, ch. 498, § 217(c), 49 Stat. 543, 561 (1935) (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10762(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)).
90. The Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948 provided antitrust immunity to collective
common motor carrier ratemaking. Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 10706 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989)). The practical
effect in the trucking industry was the formation and growth of rate bureaus, associa-
tions made up of members of the trucking industry and organized by region. They
furnish an arena in which trucking industry members may negotiate, vote upon, and
establish uniform rates. While all truckers remained free to deviate from the collec-
tively-established rates by filing independent rates, relatively few did so prior to par-
tial deregulation in 1980. See generally, Cross, Motor Carrier Rate Territories and Bureaus,
1972 TARIFF RATES AND PRACTICES-PART I 193 (papers and proceedings of the 1970
Transportation Law Institute); Popper, The Antitrust System: An Impediment to the Devel-
opment of Negotiation Models, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 283 (1983).
91. One commentator noted:
Rates are alleged to be established without apparent regard to the cost of
service, the basis for measuring rates of return and carrier revenue require-
ments is claimed to be meaningless, the freight rate structures are said to be
distorted by the uneven effects of general increases in rates, and the tariff
publications are regarded as unduly complicated.
Hardin, Corrective Actions by the Commission in the Regulation of Rates: How Fast and How
Far?, 1975 TARIFFS, RATES, AND PRACTICES-PART II 323, 324 (papers and proceed-
ings of the 1971 Transportation Law Institute). See also Steinfeld, Regulation Versus
Free Competition-The Current Battle Over Deregulation of Entry into the Motor Carrier Indus-
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deregulation92 of the motor carrier industry.93 Prominent among
these was a broad political consensus in Washington favoring dereg-
ulation in general,94 a widespread dissatisfaction with the anticompe-
titive ratemaking and entry restrictions of ICC-regulated motor
carriers, 95 and a need to control inflation96 and fuel consumption. 97
92. Since the Act was the result of a compromise between supporters and oppo-
nents of regulatory reform, the use of the word deregulation to describe it is a misno-
mer. "What emerged from Congress was not a deregulation bill, but a law which
provided new standards, not termination, for the ICC." Thorns, Rollin' On... To a
Free Market: Motor Carrier Regulation 1935-1980, 13 TRANsP. L. J. 43, 75 (1983).
"[T]he Act should be termed 'trucking reregulation.' " Kretsinger, The Motor Carrier
Act of 1980: Report and Analysis, 50 UMKC L. REV. 21 (1981).
Of course, many states continue to regulate intrastate trucking independent of
federal legislation. See generally Harper, Economic Regulation of For-Hire Trucking in the
1980s: The Case of Minnesota, 52 TRANSP. PRAc. J. 69 (1984); Symposium, Regulation of
Intrastate Motor Carriers: The Oregon Debate, 17 TRANsp. L. J. 179 (1989).
93. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, supra note 1.
94. The Carter Administration presided over airline deregulation and the sunset
of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the late 1970s. Reagan was elected on a platform
calling for a continued retreat from regulation. See Thorns, supra note 92, at 69,
71-73.
95.
Over the course of the last decade, transportation officials, economists,
and political leaders of every ideological persuasion have called for drastic
curtailment in federal regulation of the trucking industry. The reasons are
simple. It imposes enormous economic costs without demonstrable social
benefits, and it stifles competition. Regulation keeps people out of the in-
dustry who want to provide needed truck services; it prevents firms in the
industry from competing with each other on the routes they serve and on
the prices they charge; and it promotes concentration by forcing large com-
panies to buy small or marginal firms in order to acquire routes they cannot
obtain from the ICC.
Economic Regulation of the Trucking Industry: Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Sci-
ence, and Transportation of the U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1979) [hereinafter
1979 Senate Hearing].
Liberalizing regulatory reform in some form had the overwhelming support of
most smaller carriers, shippers, public interest groups, and the Justice Department,
among others. See Dively, supra note 83, at 220. Perhaps the strongest supporter of
regulatory reform was the ICC itself. Throughout the 19 7 0s, the Commission took
an increasingly liberal view towards certain regulatory functions and began the "de
facto deregulation of the trucking industry." Kretsinger, supra note 92, at 36 (The
most prominent among these was the ICC's less stringent enforcement of entry re-
quirements.).
"By 1979 the ICC was granting ninety-eight percent of the applications filed for
motor carrier operating authority. The Commission supplemented its efforts to open
the floodgates of entry and to deregulate ratemaking with numerous liberal decisions
and rulemakings." Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce Commission-Disintegration of an
American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). Thus, "[t]he Act is not a new
departure, but a codification of much of what the ICC had done in the past decade."
Thorns, supra note 92, at 73-75.
Opponents included the American Trucking Association and other trade groups
whose members stood to lose from regulatory reform. See Johnson, Ready Or Not-
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Congress correctly believed that greater rate freedom,98 fewer oper-
ating restrictions,99 and relaxed entry requirements100 would lead to
Here Comes Transportation Deregulation, 46 I.C.C. PRAC.J. 352, 356-57 (1978-1979) (sy-
nopsis of trucking industry's arguments against regulatory reform).
96. "There are very few actions that can be taken in the Congress ... which can
deal with the problem of inflation as directly as eliminating the antitrust exemption
for price-fixing and making regulatory changes that would encourage competition in
the pricing practices of freight motor carriers." 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 95, at
13 (Senator Kennedy).
97. Motor carrier operating certificate restrictions often resulted in wasted fuel
because the limitations often left carriers with no choice but to travel empty on
backhauls (return trips).
98. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10708(d) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) creates a ten percent zone
of reasonableness within which motor carriers may charge higher or lower rates with-
out the threat of suspension or revocation of those rates by the ICC.
99. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10922(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) removed operating restric-
tions which had previously limited the activities of ICC-regulated carriers. In addi-
tion to its role as a common carrier, for example, a motor common carrier after 1980
may also function as a freight forwarder and a contract carrier, and receive round-trip
authority where only one-way authority had existed in the past.
A freight forwarder is "[o]ne who in the ordinary course of business assembles
and consolidates small shipments into a single lot and assumes responsibility for
transportation of such property from point of receipt to point of destination."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 599 (5th ed. 1979). See also 49 U.S.C.S. § 10102(9) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1989).
A motor contract carrier is "a person providing motor vehicle transportation of
property for compensation under continuing agreements with one or more persons
... designed to meet the distinct needs of each such person." Id. § 10102(15)(B)(ii).
In 1983, the ICC relieved motor contract carriers from the tariff filing require-
ments. See Contract Carrier Exemption, supra note 67. The ICC's authority to do so
was derived in part from 49 U.S.C.S. § 10761(b) (1979), which states that "[tihe
Commission may grant relief from [the tariff rate requirements] to contract carriers
when relief is consistent with the public interest and the transportation policy of...
[49 U.S.C.S. § 10101]."
This exemption is important in the current undercharge controversy because
many of these disputes could have been avoided if the carrier had received contract
authority and included its negotiations with shippers in a contractual agreement.
That is, the carrier would have been providing services as a contract carrier and thus
would not have been beholden to the filing or compliance requirements that got the
carriers and shippers into this mess to begin with. See Dempsey, supra note 95. "The
decision to exempt contract carriers from their obligation to file tariffs, therefore, has
implications far beyond the . . . limited contract carrier industry. The [common]
motor carrier industry may also use the decision to avoid its statutory obligation to
file tariffs with the Commission." Id. at 39.
Most shippers failed to take advantage of contract carriage because of several
misconceptions about its ramifications. See Hoffman, The Tariff Trap, DismIBtrrIoN,
Sept. 1989, at 36, 44. This is unfortunate, because "[iun the long run, bilateral con-
tractual arrangements would avoid the litigious, expensive and frustrating by-prod-
ucts of the filed rate doctrine. In a deregulated transportation world, motor carrier
tariffs have become an anachronistic trap which, fortunately, can be avoided with
ease." Id. See also Calderwood, Buyer Beware Governs Contract Carriage, TRANSP. & Dis-
TRIBUTION, Dec. 1989, at 53.
100. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10922(b)(I)(A),(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) provides that
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more competition which would in turn lead to enhanced cost effi-
ciency, lower rates for shippers, and lower prices for consumers.' 0 '
Along with the relaxed entry requirements, the most significant
improvement from the standpoint of the free market was the loss of
the rate bureaus' cartel-like ratemaking authority.102 In place of col-
lectively-established rates, the Act encouraged motor carriers to in-
dependently determine their own rates according to market
conditions.103 Nevertheless, the Act came far short of total deregu-
lation. Much of the entry framework survived, and a myriad of other
regulations remained in force. Most significantly, Congress left the
tariff filing requirements virtually unchanged. In these respects, the
ICC-regulated motor carrier industry remained very much regulated.
F. From Negotiated Rates to Undercharge Suits
In response to the 1980 Act's call for "a variety of quality and price
options to meet changing market demands and the diverse require-
ments of the shipping ... public,"10 4 motor carriers and shippers
developed an array of independent ratemaking techriiques and initia-
those applying for operating authority need only show that they are "fit, willing, and
able to provide the transportation to be authorized.., and that the service proposed
will serve a useful public purpose, responsive to a public demand or need." See also
Harper, Entry Control and the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 12 TRANSp. L. J. 51
(1981); Wagner, Exit of Entry Controls for Motor Common Carriers: Rationale Reassessment,
50 I.C.C. PRAc.J. 163 (1983).
101. One Congressman concluded, "while the marketplace is not perfect by any
means, it is a better regulator of resources and services than a small group of bureau-
crats in Washington, D.C." S. REP. No. 96-641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980)(Sena-
tor Cannon). As it turned out, "[iln a few short years, deregulation has accomplished
virtually everything the economists had predicted .... " Hardaway, supra note 88, at
150-51.
In adopting the Act, Congress acknowledged
that the statutes governing Federal regulation of the motor carrier industry
are outdated and must be revised to reflect the transportation needs and
realities of the 1980s; that historically the existing regulatory structure has
tended in certain circumstances to inhibit market entry, [and] carrier growth
. . . [and] that protective regulation has resulted in some operating ineffi-
ciencies and some anticompetitive pricing ....
Motor Carrier Act of 1980, supra note 1, at 793.
102. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10706(a)(3), (b)(3)(D)-(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) substan-
tially curtailed the role of rate bureaus by phasing out their collective ratemaking
antitrust immunity. See generally Davis & Cunningham, Collective Ratemaking in Truck-
ing: An Interminable Issue?, 54 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 361 (1987); Tye, Scenarios of the Motor
Carrier Industry Without Collective Ratemaking, 52 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 493 (1985); Sympo-
sium: Collective Ratemaking and Consensual Decisionmaking, August 20, 1982, 32 AM. U.L.
REV. 279 (1983).
103. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10706 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). "This has resulted in a dra-
matic increase in the number of independent action filings, which now account for
two out of every three rates filed." Popper, supra note 90, at 291.
104. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10101(a)(2)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989).
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tives.105 The result was discounted rates which ranged from a few
percentage points to more than fifty percent below rates contained in
established tariffs.106 For shippers seeking "to reap the benefits of
trucking deregulation," negotiating a lower rate than the shipper
had paid for the same transportation in the past became the norm. 107
However, the negotiated rates were usually lower than the rates
that the carrier had on file with the ICC for that transportation. Car-
riers negotiating a lower-khan-filed rates- remain legally obligated to
replace the higher rate by filing the negotiated rate with the ICC.108
Yet many carriers intentionally, negligently, or otherwise failed to do
so.109 Although shippers remained legally obligated to know the
filed rates, few had the time, energy, patience, or ability to verify
those rates. ' 1 0
105. See, e.g., R. BOHMAN,JR., Foreword to GUIDE TO CUTIrNG YOUR FREIGHT TRANS-
PORTATION COSTS UNDER TRUCKING DEREGULATION (2d ed. 1982). See also Betz, Tak-
ing the Crooked Route, DISTRIBUTION, April 1986, at 69 (summary of some of the
shadier rate setting techniques practiced by both shippers and carriers).
106. See R. BOHMAN, JR., supra note 105 (discounts "ranging from 3 to 57 per-
cent"). See also N. GLASKOWSKY, EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON MOTOR CARRIERS 65
(1986) (larger shippers given rates "lower than anyone reasonably expected prior to
deregulation").
107. R. BOHMAN, JR., supra note 105. The ICC "has approved the filing of
thousands of individual tariffs embracing a wide range of discount rates, including
introductory discounts of up to fifty percent to open a new territory; aggregate
tender discounts or allowances; volume discounts; discounts specifically limited to
named facilities, commodities, or shippers; and blanket discounts." Dempsey, supra
note 95, at 40. See generally Breen, Antitrust and Price Competition in the Trucking Industry,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 201 (1983).
108. 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10761, 10762 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
109. The ICC has been unable to determine why the unfiled negotiated rates
problem developed, whether from carrier inadvertence or intent. Negotiated Rates I,
supra note 15, at 105. One commentator has concluded that "only a few phantom-
rate situations result from deliberate fraud. Most flow from condemnable, but hon-
est, carrier negligence." Chapman, Phantom Rates-Another Freight Bill Goblin, DISTRI-
BUTION, May 1985, at 11, 112.
Prior to 1980, motor carriers almost universally adhered to the rates collectively
established and filed by the rate bureaus. Independent deviation from these sched-
ules, while allowed, was uncommon. In the competitive post-1980 environment,
however, the rate bureau tariffs often merely served as points of departure for negoti-
ated discounts. Discount negotiations typically occurred through informal telephone
conversations, with the shipper believing that the carrier would properly file the dis-
count rate. In the fast-moving deregulated market, the paperwork required to file the
rates often backed up, and the new rates were frequently forgotten and remained
unfiled. Id.
110. See Quinn, A Business... Not a Bureaucracy, TRAFFIC MGMT., June 1985, at 9
(editorial lamenting the negotiated rates quagmire). There are several reasons for
the shippers' general inability to keep up with the filed rates. The sharp increase in
independently-filed rates, coupled with the general decline of the function of rate
bureaus, which before regulatory reform had generally ensured that rates were filed
with the ICC, led to a chaotic rate environment. "The inevitable result of free market
needs still tied to a filed tariff system [was] an avalanche of paper. The volume and
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To make matters worse, conditions at the ICC were such that the
ICC was unable to respond to shipper rate inquiries in a timely man-
ner, if at all. "'1 In addition, the ICC was unlikely to discover unfiled
negotiated rates on its own. Between 1980 and 1987, the number of
ICC employees and field offices was more than halved, while the
number of independently-filed carrier pricing initiatives more than
tripled.12 The ICC was unable or unwilling to keep Up,] s the tariff
filing system collapsed, and carriers hauled freight throughout the
country at unfiled negotiated rates.
variety of tariff matter increase[d] exponentially as the number of carriers and serv-
ices expand[ed] to meet competitive demands." Hoffman, supra note 99, at 38.
Moreover, the number of tariffs on file with the ICC has been estimated at approxi-
mately three trillion. Bohman, The TariffBoom, TRAFFIC MGMT., May 1988, at 27, 28.
Where many shippers had maintained tariff libraries in the past, "[tihey just don't
have large enough staffs to maintain tariff libraries anymore." Trunick, Undercharges
Won't Go Away, TRANSP. & DISTRIBtrrIoN, July 1989, at 7. Finally, if the sheer number
of published tariffs were not daunting enough, a tariff itself can be difficult if not
impossible to interpret. "For example, a single tariff of one carrier consists of more
than 200 separate volumes, each having 400 to 500 pages, all without any index or
other finding aids." Hoffman, supra note 99, at 38. In this environment, it has be-
come unrealistic to expect shippers, especially small shippers, to verify filed rates.
But see. Overwhelmed With New Rates? Here's One Company's Solution, HANDLING & SHIP-
PING MGMT., March 1983, at 52 (large shipper uses computers and progressive man-
agement to stay abreast of the new competitive rate-making situation).
Nevertheless, Congress and the ICC have long been aware of the problems ship-
pers encounter when attempting to ascertain the filed rate. The present controversy
is not the first time shippers have been faced with a situation where their inability to
ascertain the rates applicable to their shipments compelled them to rely on the repre-
sentations of carriers, and left them without a defense when undercharges resulted.
In order to force carriers to be more forthright when quoting rates and representing
the rates as being filed, Congress in 1910 adopted an amendment that provided for
civil damages of up to $250 payable to the government where the carrier "through its
proper agent refuses or omits to give a statement of the proper rate for a described
shipment requested in writing, or misstates the rate, as a result of which the shipper
suffers a loss." H.B. FULLER, supra note 32, at 280-81 (referring to Act of June 18,
1910, ch. 309, § 9, 36 Stat. 539, 548). However, no redress was provided the ship-
per, who remained "conclusively presumed" to know and expected to abide by the
filed rates. Id. at 281-82.
111. See Quinn, supra note 110.
112. The number of ICC employees decreased from 1,952 in 1980 to 735 in 1988;
the number of ICC field offices decreased from 55 in 1985 to 22 in 1988; the number
of independently-filed rates increased from 394,000 in 1979 to 1.2 million in fiscal
year 1987. Economic Regulation of the Motor Carrier Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Surface Transportation of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, House of Repre-
sentatives, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 40, 56 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 House Hearing].
113. Then-ICC Chairman Gradison testified that the ICC could not "police the
millions of transactions that take place in a given year, nor should [it]. It's impossible
to fathom going back and instigating charges against parties for perfectly reasonable,
mutually-agreed upon transactions which took place as long as five years ago." Id. at
38. Indeed, "[tihe ICC has become a quiet repository of unread tariffs." N. GtAs-
KOWSKY, supra note 106, at 65.
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Meanwhile, relaxed entry requirements meant intensified competi-
tion as the number of ICC-regulated motor carriers more than
doubled between the years 1979 and 1988.114 Consequently, price
cutting and across-the-board discounting became even more wide-
spread among motor carriers struggling for business in the reces-
sionary market of the early 1980s. 115 Declining profits resulted in
bankruptcy for many and hastened the industry's consolidation. Be-
tween 1978 and 1985, the failure rate in the ICC-regulated trucking
industry more than quintupled.116
Enter the bankruptcy trustees, the credit companies, and the
freight-bill audit houses. Once a defunct carrier's billing records
were made available to one of these agents during bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, shippers who negotiated and paid a rate lower than the
filed rate began to receive balance-due notices for the un-
dercharges.117 Countless carriers or carrier agents brought suit
against shippers who refused to settle. By arguing that the filed rate
doctrine strictly precludes payment of any rate other than the rate
filed with the ICC, the shipper's shield was turned into the carrier's
sword.' 18 Undercharge suits had become the "poor stepchildren" of
regulatory reform.119
G. The Development of the Negotiated Rates Doctrine
1. Buckeye Cellulose
In 1985, the ICC made the first significant chink in the filed rate
114. The number increased from 17,083 in 1979, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DEP'T,
AM. TRUCKING Ass'N, AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS 13 (1986) [hereinafter AMERICAN
TRUCKING TRENDS], to over 39,000 in 1989. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at
632.
115. See, e.g., The No. 1 Trucker Joins a Price-Cutting Convoy, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 8,
1982, at 32. For an excellent discussion on the rise of rate discounting and its effects,
see Breen, supra note 107.
116. The number increased from about 27 per 10,000 companies in 1978 to about
190 per 10,000 companies in 1985. AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS, supra note 114, at
30 (failure data in graph form). Approximately 20 of the largest 100 carriers failed,
including the fifth and sixth largest ranked firms. N. GLASKOWSKY, supra note 106, at
8. During the same period, the failure rates for all businesses rose at a lower rate,
from about 25 per 10,000 to about 110 per 10,000. AMERICAN TRUCKING TRENDS,
supra note 114, at 30. See also Chow & Gritta, Motor Carrier Bankruptcy in an Uncertain
Environment, 14 TRANSP. L. J. 39 (1985).
117. See, e.g., Hoffman, Are Your Freight Bills Coming Back to Haunt You?, DISTRIBU-
TION, March 1985, at 45, 50. "[T]here's a logical explanation why these freight-bill
nightmares tend only to surface after a carrier's demise." Id. Carriers aren't likely to
point out mistakes or to send balance-due bills which could result in undercharges
for fear of alienating shippers. "But collection agencies [appointed by the bank-
ruptcy court] aren't the least bit shy." Id.
118. Shippers to Fight Carrier Undercharges, TRAFFIC MGMT., April 1985, at 16.
119. Proposal Would End Key Round of Undercharge Battle, PURCHASING, Sept. 15,
1988, at 53 [hereinafter Proposal].
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doctrine's armor with Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R. 120 On referral from federal district court, the ICC in Buckeye
modified its interpretation of the filed rate doctrine to permit equita-
ble defenses where the shipper had relied on a rail carrier's misquo-
tation of a tariff "whose meaning was not plain to the ordinary
user."' 2 ' The ICC held that in light of the changes brought about by
partial deregulation122 it would be an unreasonable practice for the
carrier to collect the undercharges, and authorized their waiver.123
In so doing, the ICC broke new ground in several respects.
The ICC declared that the issue of whether the collection of un-
dercharges would be an unreasonable practice was within its primary
jurisdiction.124 Relying on a more liberal interpretation of sections
10701(a) and 10705,125 the ICC concluded that the language of the
statute and the meaning of the word "practice" was broad enough to
allow it to prevent "the practice of unreasonably collecting un-
120. 1 I.C.C.2d 767 (1985).
121. Id. at 773. At issue was the difference between the negotiated and paid multi-
car rate and the higher, single-car, filed rate. Id. at 768. The ICC held that "the
publication of a tariff whose meaning is not plain to the ordinary user [but not neces-
sarily technically ambiguous], coupled with a misquotation... tQ its detriment, con-
stitute circumstances under which we may find that the collection of the
undercharges would be an unreasonable practice." Id. at 773. The court limited its
holding by emphasizing that it "applies only where the difficulty of interpreting a
tariff is such that the shipper reasonably relies on the carrier's interpretation and
does so to its detriment." Id.
On the issue of equitable defenses, the ICC cited several cases in which courts
and the ICC had "absolv[ed] shippers from liability to pay the tariff rate in particu-
larly egregious circumstances." Id. at 772. The ICC reasoned that "it is well estab-
lished that we have the right to address both equity and policy considerations in
deciding whether a particular remedy is appropriate." Id.
122. Congress partially deregulated the interstate rail carrier industry with the
Staggers Railroad Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified in various
sections of 11, 45, and 49 U.S.C.S. (Law. Co-op. 1989)). Its purpose was "to provide
for the restoration and improvement of the physical facilities and financial stability of
the rail system of the United States." Id. at 1897.
Regarding the interplay between regulatory reform and the ICA's antidis-
crimination provisions, the ICC reasoned:
Today, the inability of a shipper to rely on a carrier's interpretation of a
tariff is a greater evil than the remote possibility that a carrier might inten-
tionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to discriminate illegally between
shippers. A shipper has a duty to ascertain the correct rate for itself, but
where there is a substantial question as to the correct interpretation of a
tariff, even if the tariff is not technically ambiguous, it is reasonable for the
shipper to rely on the carrier's interpretation ....
The present case perfectly illustrates circumstances under which the
collection of undercharges should be deemed an unreasonable practice.
Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 1 I.C.C.2d at 773.
123. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 1 I.C.C.2d at 774.
124. See id. at 771.
125. 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10701(a), 10705 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989).
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dercharges."1 26 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
ICC in all respects.
127
2. Negotiated Rates I
Although the ICC's decision in Buckeye arose in the context of un-
dercharges by a rail carrier, the ICC used the term "carrier" broadly,
laying the foundation for a decision devoted exclusively to motor
carriers a year and a half later in Negotiated Rates 1.128 In September
of 1985, six months after its decision in Buckeye, the ICC began an
investigation to determine how it should respond to the growing
number of defunct motor carrier bankruptcy trustees and others who
were abusing the new rate flexibility by sending balance-due notices
to, and often bringing suit against, shippers that paid for carriage
under discounted but unfiled rates. The ICC began its investigation
in response to a petition filed by the National Industrial Transporta-
tion League (NITL), a shipper's group. 129 The NITL proposed that
the ICC adopt a rule, the substance of which has since emerged as
the negotiated rates doctrine.130
The ICC refused to adopt the NITL proposal. The ICC instead
declared that it would accept cases only on referral from a court and
that its determinations in motor carrier negotiated rates undercharge
suits would be merely advisory.' 3 ' The ICC adopted a statement de-
126. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 1 I.C.C.2d at 771 & n.12.
127. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Louisville N. R.R., 1 I.C.C.2d 767 (1985), aff'd sub
nom. Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635, 636 (11 th Cir. 1986). The
court noted that in allowing the shipper to waive the undercharges, "the Commission
made an abrupt change from former policy which required the collection of undercharges
... no matter how unfair or unreasonable that might be in a given case." Id. (empha-
sis added).
128. Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at 99.
129, Id.
130. Id. at 99-100-
This first version of the negotiated rates doctrine would have created a rebutta-
ble presumption in favor of the application of the negotiated rate. Id. at 102 n.8.
The NITL's proposed rule stated:
Where a motor common carrier and shipper have negotiated and
agreed upon a specific rate for particular traffic, and the carrier has failed to
file the rate in the tariff form with the [ICC], the negotiated rate is the maxi-
mum reasonable rate which may be charged by the carrier for all shipments
which have been tendered by the shipper to the carrier to be transported
under the negotiated rate if the shipper acted with a good faith belief that
the negotiated rate was the legally applicable rate.
Id. at 99 n.1.
131. The ICC stated its first negotiated rates policy as follows:
[W]e offer to undertake an advisory analysis of whether a negotiated but
unpublished rate existed, the circumstances surrounding assessment of the
tariff rate, and any other pertinent facts. We would, at a court's request,
determine, based on all relevant circumstances, whether collection of un-
dercharges based on the rate contained in the filed tariff would constitute an
unreasonable practice and, if a negotiated rate is found to exist, whether this
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claring that "the filed rate doctrine does not necessarily bar equita-
ble defenses" in motor carrier undercharge litigation.132
While the adoption of this statement was significant, the ICC in
Negotiated Rates I broke no new ground other than to apply the princi-
ples of Buckeye more broadly to motor carriers. The result was a dis-
appointment to almost everyone. Shippers believed that the ICC
had not gone far enough,1ss and motor carriers and their agents
feared it had gone too far. Is4
In the process, the ICC lost much of its credibility in the eyes of
many shippers, carriers, commentators, and courts.13 5 It had missed
amount is all the carrier should be permitted to collect. The referring court
would retain final authority to set the remedy, if any, and review our
determination.
Id. at 107. The ICC reasoned that the "NITL's specific proposal conflicts with the
requirements of section 10761 and the long-standing judicial construction of those
requirements." Id. at 102-03. The NITL rule "is virtually a per se determination that,
as a matter of law, the negotiated rate would apply and is, thus, in direct conflict with
the statute." Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 100. See generally Callari, Shippers Win Early Round in Balance-Due Bill
Fight, TRAFFIC MGMT., Oct. 1987, at 33 (review of ICC's early application of Negoti-
ated Rates I).
133. Wastler, Undercharge Battle Rages on as Issue Wends Through Courts, TRAFFIC
WORLD, Jan. 23, 1989, at 33.
See also Quinn, Timidity at the ICC, TRAFFIC MGmrr., Aug. 1986, at 9:
. The... [ICC] has displayed a discouraging "play-it-safe" attitude in its
ruling on filed rates vs. negotiated rates.
What that federal agency could have done is settle the back-billing prob-
lem that has been plaguing shippers once and for all. What it actually did was
to hand down a compromise decision that's going to result in confusion and
uncertainty.
(Emphasis in original.)
Negotiated Rates I "turned out to be a toothless decision that settled nothing."
Quinn, supra note 8, at 11.
134. "This decision has given an undeserved respectability to unfiled motor com-
mon carrier rates. The courts ... [should restore] the standard of equality that...
[previously] existed." Goodman, Unfiled Motor Common Carrier Rates Gain New Respecta-
bility as the ICC Celebrates its Centennial, 54 TRANSP. PRAc. J. 292, 314 (1987). "The net
result has been a litigation explosion, and a split in the district court opinions that
have flowed from this litigation." Steinfeld, The Real Villain-The ICC, TRAFFIC
WORLD, March 27, 1989, at 29.
135. "The ink was hardly dry on the ICC's opinion before various courts served
notice that... [Negotiated Rates I] would be insufficient to carry the day for shipper
defendants in undercharge litigation." Hoffman, supra note 99, at 38. The "ICC
prefers to act as an advisor to the court, rather than declare a position on the subject
.... [T]his has 'dug a hole' for shipper groups, which want the government to rule,
once and for all, that carriers' failure to file rates is against the law." Undercharges: A
Tie Score, DISTRIBUTION, May 1988, at 18.
"[M]ost courts usually don't bother to request the ICC's opinion." ICC to Move
Against Phoney Undercharge Claims, PURCHASING, June 16, 1988, at 47. "Based on ...
the advisory nature of the ICC's rulings, some courts have rejected the . . . [ICC's
policy] and ruled in favor of the bankrupt carrier." Wastler, supra note 133, at 33.
"Two bankruptcy courts [in Minnesota and North Carolina] handling undercharge
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an opportunity to significantly stem the flow of undercharge suits,
exacerbating one of the very problems Congress had charged it to
resolve: unreasonable practices.136
3. Negotiated Rates H
A year and a half later, the undercharge problem continued to
cause headaches for nearly everyone in the transportation commu-
nity.'57 The NITL and other shipper groups remained greatly dis-
satisfied with the reactions of many courts to the ICC's indecisive
approach to undercharge claims in Negotiated Rates 1.138 So in Febru-
ary of 1988 the NITL again requested the ICC to invalidate such
claims by issuing a general order declaring it to be an unreasonable
practice per se for motor carriers to do business at unfiled negotiated
rates and to later use the filed rate as the basis of an undercharge
suit.139 The ICC again refused.140 In a decision published in June of
claims have taken a strong stand against referring cases to the ICC." Courts Tell ICC:
Get Off Our Turf, PURCHASING, June 30, 1988, at 31. This has cast "serious doubt on
the ICC's ability to influence court rulings through a declaratory order." Courts' Re-
fusal to Refer Undercharge Cases to ICC Erodes Agency Action, TRAFFIC WORLD, May 9,
1988, at 41.
See also Dempsey, supra note 95, at 2-3 lamenting the ICC's general deregulatory
bent: "What has happened to this venerable and highly respected legal institution of
the American Government? How could an agency on the pinnacle of integrity, com-
petence, and independence fall to the depths of irresponsibility in so short a period
of time?"
136. See National Indus. Transp. League-Petition for a Declaratory Order on Ne-
gotiated Motor Common Carrier Rates, No. MC-C-30090, slip op. at 3 (ICC April 14,
1988) [hereinafter NITL Petition of 4/14/88] ("I continue to believe.., that many of
these problems are largely of the Commission's own making, and consequently easily
remedied by modifications to what has been the majority's approach to date in MC-
177 case handling.") (Commissioner Lamboley concurring). See also Steinfeld, supra
note 134. The "courts quickly recognize[d] who .. .[was] to blame for this entire
undercharge mess-the ICC." Id.
137. By this time, the only groups who continued to benefit from undercharge
suits were the freight rate audit houses and their attorneys. See Quinn, Time to Slay the
Undercharge Monster, TRAFFIC MGMT., July 1989, at 11. The audit houses typically
keep from 50% to 75% of the money collected from shippers on a bankrupt carrier's
behalf. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 50. In one case, the court noted that the carrier's
estate would wind up with only 21% of any amount collected after the attorneys took
30% of the total and after the audit house took 70% of the balance. In re Rose
Freight Lines, Inc., No. BKY 4-87-2990, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 10,
1989). Such results have led observers to conclude that " '[it's a racket.' " Bankrupt
Truckers Pushing Phoney "Undercharge" Claims, PURCHASING, May 12, 1988, at 25.
138. See, e.g., NITL Petition of 4/14/88, supra.note 136, at 2. The "NITL be-
lieve[d] that some of the uncertainty relating to [Negotiated Rates I] (resulting in
some courts' refusal to refer these cases) arises from the Commission's characterizing
its decisions as non-binding and advisory." Id.
139. This NITL negotiated rates proposal requested that the ICC issue a generic
declaration that: "[lIt is an unreasonable practice, and thus a violation of the [ICA],
for a motor common carrier to conduct business on the basis of a negotiated and
1990]
33
Chilstrom: The Negotiated Rates Doctrine [Maislin Industries v. Primary Stee
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1990
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
1989, the Commission instead reopened and clarified Negotiated Rates
I, breaking new ground, nevertheless, in several respects.141
In Negotiated Rates II, the ICC explicitly assumed primary jurisdic-
tion over undercharge suits and announced that it would, for the first
time, allow shippers to bring such disputes directly to the ICC,
rather than requiring shippers to wait for a court referral.142 In addi-
tion, the ICC put some teeth into its decision by declaring that, pur-
suant to its primary jurisdiction, its determinations were "binding
and dispositive" and reviewable only to ascertain whether they were
arbitrary or capricious. 143
Shipping interests were generally encouraged by the ICC's action
and anticipated that it would bolster the position of shippers defend-
ing undercharge claims.144 Carriers' and auditors' groups concluded
that the decision changed nothing, noting that the courts, and not
the ICC, have the final say in such matters.' 45 While the ICC's clari-
fication of its primary jurisdiction was a step forward, the ICC's as-
sertion that it would begin to resolve these disputes without court
referral, while at the same time retaining its system of case-by-case
review, 146 proved shortsighted and unworkable.
agreed-to-rate while failing to publish the rate in an effective tariff on file with the
[ICC]." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 623.
The NITL reasoned that "the need for such an order is criticalbecause the col-
lection activities by motor common carriers (or'their agents) have increased." NITL
Proposal of 4/14/88, supra note 136, at 1. The NITL hoped courts would then use
the proposed declaration to deny undercharge claims which met the standards an-
nounced by the ICC.
140. The ICC decided to hold the NITL petition in abeyance until it could assess
the impact of the measures it did adopt. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 624.
141. Id. at 623.
142. Id. at 626-27. The ICC also clarified its definition of "equitable defenses,"
stating that the label was a misnomer since § 10701 conferred upon the ICC the legal
authority to allow shippers' defenses to the filed rate doctrine where the reasonable-
ness of practices was an issue. Id. at 628.
143. Id. at 624. Nevertheless, one commentator aptly stated that Negotiated Rates
II "does not diminish the controversy-if that was [the ICC's] goal they missed it by a
mile." Wastler, supra, note 16, at 35 (quoting an auditor's attorney). Indeed, ICC
Chairman Gradison had unsuccessfully urged the majority "to take the one final step
which could be taken administratively to help alleviate the negotiated rates difficulties
which continue to plague shippers" and adopt the NITL proposal. Negotiated Rates
II, supra note 14, at 638. (Chairman Gradison dissenting). "[T]he Commission can,
and must, move decisively to counteract the blatant abuse of a regulatory system by a
small but persistent group of motor common carriers." Id. at 638-39.
144. One NITL official noted that the organization was " 'very, very pleased. ...
This will help tremendously all the shippers out there that are receiving balance-due
bills.' " Wastler, supra note 16, at 35.
145. One freight rate audit house executive observed that "[iut's a nothing finding
by a group that clearly cannot make up its mind on what its jurisdiction is." Id.
146. The ICC claimed that in order to cope with the expected onslaught of un-
dercharge cases, it had "directed [its] staff to develop a flexible docket management
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4. Negotiated Rates III
In December of 1989, less than six months after the ICC issued
Negotiated Rates II, the Commission made a partial about-face by an-
nouncing that it would be "unable to participate in most civil actions
for undercharges" brought to the ICC by defendant-shippers for an
initial determination.147 The ICC explained that in light of the split
between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, and due to budgetary re-
straints and the fact that the ICC's small staff of attorneys could
barely fulfill its normal functions, the ICC would generally not par-
ticipate in the numerous shipper requests for ICC assistance.148
Thus whether by lack of resolve, foresight, or resources, by the end
of 1989 it had become clear that the ICC would be unable to lead the
motor carrier industry out of the negotiated rates quagmire.
5. Proposed Legislation
In the fall of 1989, the NITL, the SNFCC, 14 9 and others150 devel-
oped and presented to Congress legislation which would go a long
way toward resolving the controversy.' 5 ' The proposed bill would
partially codify the negotiated rates doctrine,'5 2 decrease the statute
plan for these cases which will include participation by our Office of Hearings to
ensure their expeditious handling." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 624.
147. Petition to Institute Rulemaking on Negotiated Common Carrier Rates (ex
parte No. MC-177) (Sub-No. 1), slip op. at 1 (ICC Dec. 11, 1989) [hereinafter Negoti-
ated Rates III]. In its petition filed February 5, 1988, the NITL had urged a generic
unreasonableness finding because "the case-by-case approach adopted by the Com-
mission [in Negotiated Rates I had] already resulted in a substantial caseload, which
could become overwhelming." NITL Proposal of 4/14/88, supra note 136, at 5. Ir-
resolutely as usual, the ICC in Negotiated Rates II instead decided to "hold the peti-
tion in . ..abeyance for further consideration based on experience gained after
implementation of these measures." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 624.
Six months later, the ICC's "experience" was that it had indeed become com-
pletely overwhelmed by independently-filed negotiated rates suits, and that its "flexi-
ble docket management plan" was a hopeless failure. Id.
148. Negotiated Rates III, supra note 147, at 3-5. As an alternative, the ICC sug-
gested that shippers file "this general notice" along with the ICC's recommendations
embodied in Negotiated Rates I & II. Id. at 4.
149. The Shipper's National Freight Claim Council. But see Wastler, SNFCC Reects
Agreement for Undercharge Relief, TRAFFIC WORLD, March 20, 1989, at 8. The SNFCC
withdrew its support of the legislation because it refused to agree to a provision ad-
vanced by carriers to reduce the statute of limitations in both undercharge and over-
charge suits, the latter typically brought by shippers. Id. at 9.
150. Most prominent among these was the American Trucking Association (ATA).
151. H.R. 3243, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter H.R. 3243]. The NITL
and others had advanced legislation in the fall of 1988. However, they failed to gar-
ner the full support of the ATA and were unable to get the proposal introduced as a
bill, and the idea was eventually shelved. See, e.g., Foster, No More Mister Nice Guy,
DISTRmIBUrION, April 1989, at 4 (editorial); Proposal, supra note 119.
152. Like Negotiated Rates II, the bill only partially endorses the negotiated rates
doctrine because it still requires case-by-case referral to the ICC. Since the ICC is
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of limitations on undercharge claims from three years to eighteen
months,153 and allow carriers to continue to offer discounts while
protecting shippers from inadvertent filing errors.] 54 The law, if en-
acted, would apply to future and pending undercharge litigation.'55
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the spring of 1990, however, the attention of the transportation
industry remained focused on the courts. The circuits had clearly
delineated the two sides to the debate. On one side was the Fifth
Circuit, the first circuit to address the issue and the only circuit to
hold in favor of a carrier.156 On the other side was the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the second circuit to address the issue and the first to hold for
the shipper.15 7 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the filed rate doc-
trine did not obligate the shipper to pay the motor common carrier
higher rates than those at which the parties had done business.
A. The Facts
Defendant Primary Steel, Inc. (Primary) ships steel products to its
already unable to administer the flood of undercharge cases, the referral requirement
is the bill's potentially fatal flaw. On this point, the bill states:
Where tariff rates or charges are sought to be collected in addition to those
originally billed and collected by [an ICC-regulated] common carrier.... a
person may assert that the collection of such tariff rates or charges or impo-
sition of rules, classifications, or practices, would be an unreasonable prac-
tice in violation of section 10701 or otherwise a violation of this subtitle and
such issue shall be determined by the Commission. In instances where a
civil suit is brought under section 11706(a) of this subtitle, such issues shall
be referred to and be determined by the Commission under its primary
jurisdiction.
H.R. 3243, supra note 151, at 2.
153. Id. at 2-3. For claims accruing within the first year of enactment, the limita-
tion would be 24 months. Id. at 2. The same limitations would apply to overcharge
suits. Id. at 3.
154. On this point, the bill states:
Subject to Commission review, motor carriers subject to the [ICC's] ju-
risdiction ... and shippers may resolve, by mutual consent, overcharge and
undercharge claims resulting from billing errors or incorrect tariff provi-
sions arising from the inadvertent failure to properly and timely file and
maintain agreed upon rates, rules, or classifications in compliance with sec-
tions 10761 and 10762 of this title, or under circumstances where applica-
tion of the filed tariff would be an unreasonable practice .... Nothing in
this section shall relieve the motor carrier of the duty to file rates, rules, and
classifications as required in sections 10761 and 10762.
Id. at 3-4.
155. Id. at 5.
156. In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc., 864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989). See infra
notes 200-07 and accompanying text.
157. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989).
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customers via motor carriers.158 In 1979, a representative from
plaintiff Maislin Industries, Inc. (Maislin)t59 solicited some of Pri-
mary's steel traffic. During rate negotiations, Maislin's representa-
tive stated that Maislin could ship at rates competitive with or lower
than those Primary was paying its present carrier, and Primary began
shipping with Maislin later that year.'
60
The parties negotiated rates throughout the course of their rela-
tionship. In 1982 Primary told Maislin that Primary would end their
association unless Maislin lowered its rates, and the parties agreed to
lower rates.' 6 ' Maislin's rate director approved all negotiated rate
changes, and, for many of the shipments in controversy, Maislin's
agent prepared, signed, and distributed to Primary rate sheets re-
flecting the lower rates.' 6 2
Primary had no reason to suspect the negotiated rates were im-
proper or unlawful. Maislin carried and billed at those rates.' 63 Pri-
mary made payment at those rates, understood that they were
approved by the appropriate Maislin personnel,164 and expected
Maislin to do what was necessary to legalize them.1
6 5
For reasons unknown,' 6 6 Maislin failed to file the negotiated rates
with the ICC.167 From January 1981 until November 1983, Maislin
carried for Primary -1,081 shipments at negotiated rates lower than
those on file with the ICC.168 The difference between the filed rates
and the negotiated rates amounted to almost $188,000.169 Maislin
went bankrupt in 1983.170
158. Primary Steel, Inc. v. Maislin Indus., No. MC-C-10961, slip op. at 1-2 (ICC
Jan. 12, 1988) [hereinafter ICC Maislin Order].
159. At that time, the soliciting carrier was actually Quinn Freight Lines, Inc. Id.
at 2. Quinn became a division of Maislin in 1981. Id. at 3. This comment will make
no further distinction between Maislin and the Quinn subsidiary.
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 9.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 3 & n.7.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Id. at 2.
169. -Id.
170. Maislin filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on July 11, 1983. In re Maislin In-
dus., 50 Bankr. 943, 945 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). Shortly thereafter, Carrier Credit
& Collection, Inc. (CCC) was appointed to represent Maislin in its bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and proceeded to audit Maislin's pre-bankruptcy freight bills to ascertain
whether Maislin's customers had paid the rates on file with the ICC. Id.
As collection agencies go, CCC has a particularly poor reputation among ship-
pers, who object to CCC's detached production line modus operandi. See Hoffman,
supra note 117, at 50 (shippers describe CCC's "inhospitable approach"). In re-
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B. The District Court Proceedings I
In 1985, Maislin brought suit against Primary in the United States
Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri to recover
the undercharges.171 Primary countered that the ICC had primary
jurisdiction and moved that the proceedings be stayed to allow the
ICC to make its determination in the matter.1 72 The district court
agreed that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction compelled it to refer
to the ICC the substantive issues: whether the rates were reasonable
and whether their collection would be an unreasonable practice.1
73
C. The ICC's Analysis
The Commission concluded that collection of the undercharges
would be an unreasonable practice. This required two findings: (1)
that Maislin or a Maislin agent upon whom Primary could reasonably
rely quoted and negotiated a rate with Primary other than the filed
rate, and (2) that Primary's reliance upon the quoted and negotiated
rate was reasonable.174
The ICC relied upon its decisions in Buckeye and Negotiated Rates I
to reason that its primary jurisdiction over the reasonableness of a
carrier's practices allowed it to consider all the circumstances of this
dispute to determine whether Maislin's billing practices were unrea-
sonable.175 By applying its "Negotiated Rates policy,"176 the ICC
found that negotiated rates existed, 177 and that Primary reasonably
relied on Maislin's representations that they had been filed.178 The
ICC proceeded to allow Primary's equitable defenses and concluded
sponse to widespread allegations that CCC had abused and intimidated shippers, the
ICC investigated and agreed to monitor CCC's activities. Id. at 50, 52.
171. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., No. 85-0021-CV-W-1 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 3,
1985) (order granting referral to ICC).
172. See Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1401, 1402 (W.D. Mo.
1988).
173. ICC Maislin Order, supra note 158, at 1.
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id. at 5. "The decisions in Seaboard, Negotiated Rates, and Buckeye confirm
that sections 10701(a) and 10704 give us [this] authority." Id. Specifically, these
circumstances were simply that an authorized agent of Maislin quoted "a series of
rates for a continuing period of time" upon which Primary reasonably relied. Id. at
10.
176. Id. at 8-10. That policy was "intended to temper the harsh effects of the filed
rate doctrine when it could be shown that the shipper and carrier negotiated and
agreed on a rate that was not published in a tariff." Id. at 8.
177. Id. at 5-8.
178. Id. at 8-9. As to Maislin's intent, the ICC stated that "[tihe most that can be
said in this regard is that [Maislin] actively negotiated to obtain Primary's business
and that it lowered its rates to meet the competition .... While [Maislin] may not
have taken appropriate steps to legalize the quoted rates, [there is no evidence of]
unlawful conduct." Id. at 9.
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that it would be an unreasonable practice for Maislin to collect the
undercharges. 1
79
D. The District Court Proceedings H
Almost three years after its referral to the ICC, the case was re-
turned to the district court. The district court reaffirmed its prior
decision that ICC had primary jurisdiction over Maislin's prac-
tices.180 The court also adopted the ICC's findings of fact,181 found
the ICC's decision was "supported by substantial evidence,"' 82 ac-
corded the decision "substantial deference," 83 and granted Pri-
mary's motion for summary judgment.1
84
E. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Analysis
The issue before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was simply
framed: whether the filed rate doctrine obligated Primary to pay
Maislin higher rates than those they had negotiated and at which
they had done business but which Maislin had failed to file.185 The
court upheld the ruling of the ICC and affirmed the judgment of the
district court, holding: (1) whether Maislin's billing practices were
reasonable vas an issue within the ICC's primary jurisdiction, 186 (2)
the ICC may alter its previous policy interpretations, and (3) courts
must accept the new interpretations if they are reasonable.187
1. The ICC's Primary Jurisdiction
The ICC's primary jurisdiction in negotiated rates undercharge
cases was an issue of first impression in the Eighth Circuit.188 The
179. Id. at 10.
180. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (W.D. Mo.
1988). The court cited Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1976)
(questions turning "on a determination of the reasonableness of a challenged prac-
tice" should be referred to the ICC), and Iowa Beef Processors v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 685 F.2d 255, 260 (8th Cir. 1982) (referral to ICC necessary where claim re-
quires inquiry into lawfulness of carrier's practices).
181. Maislin, 705 F. Supp. at 1403.
182. Id. at 1407.
183. Id. at 1402. The court stated that it would not set aside such an ICC determi-
nation "unless it exceeds the ICC's statutory authority or is unsupported by substan-
tial evidence." Id. " '[T]he reviewing court is not to substitute its conclusions for
those of the Commission.'" Id. (quoting Erickson Transport Corp. v. ICC, 728 F.2d
1057, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 1984)).
184. Maislin, 705 F. Supp. at 1407.
185. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d 400, 401 (8th Cir. 1989).
186. Id. at 404.
187. Id. at 406.
188. Id. at 403.
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court partially relied on Buckeye, 18 9 where the Eleventh Circuit held
that it was within the ICC's primary jurisdiction to consider the rea-
sonableness of a carrier's practices in disputes where the unreasona-
ble collection of undercharges is alleged.190 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded: "We are satisfied that the reasonable-
ness of Maislin's billing practices is a matter properly within the
ICC's primary jurisdiction."' 9 ' The court based its decision on the
primary jurisdiction doctrine's traditional rationales: that the ICC
should determine issues of national transportation policy;' 92 that the
ICC should interpret questions involving "the reasonableness of a
challenged practice;"' 93 that the ICC should resolve issues which re-
quire its "special expertise;" and that it should do all these things in
order to promote uniform regulation.194
2. Equitable Defenses to the Filed Rate Doctrine
On the issue of the traditional rule against equitable defenses to
the filed rate doctrine, the court concluded that "the district [courts
are] required to enforce the tariff provisions of [the filed rate doc-
trine], unless the ICC, upon referral by the district court, determines
that a carrier's billing practices were unreasonable and that to en-
force the tariff requirement would be unlawful."195
The court did not abrogate the filed rate doctrine altogether, how-
ever, because Primary's argument involved the statute-based defense
of section 10701(a) rather than a purely equitable argument. The
court simply followed the ICC's harmonization of two facially con-
flicting provisions of the ICA.196 The court concluded that this "ap-
proach... does not abolish the filed rate doctrine, but merely allows
the ICC to consider all of the circumstances, including equitable de-
189. Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 1 I.C.C.2d 767 (1985), aff'd
sub nom. Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11th Cir. 1986).
190. " '[Finding a carrier practice unreasonable is the kind of determination that
lies in the primary jurisdiction of the Commission.'" Maislin, 879 F.2d at 403 (quot-
ing Seaboard, 794 F.2d at 638).
191. Id.
192. Id. (citing United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 65 (1956)).
193. Id. (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304-06 (1976)).
194. Id. (quoting Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 685 F.2d
255, 259 (8th Cir. 1982)).
195. Id. at 405.
196. The court stated:
Section 10761(a), which mandates the collection of tariff rates, is only
part of an overall regulatory scheme administered by the ICC, and there is
no provision in the [ICA] elevating this section over section 10701, which
requires that tariff rates be reasonable. When conflicts between two provi-
sions arise, "it is not for ... [courts] to place enforcement of one doctrine
above the other." Instead, the proper authority to harmonize these compet-
ing provisions is the ICC.
Id. (quoting In re Tucker Freight Lines, Inc., 85 Bankr. 426, 429 (W.D. Mich. 1988)).
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fenses, to determine if strict adherence tothe filed rate doctrine
would constitute an unreasonable practice."1 97
3. ICC Policy Interpretations
The court rejected the argument that the ICC had acted outside
the scope of its regulatory authority, stating that "the ICC may...
alter its past [interpretations of the ICA] and we must accept that
change if the new interpretation is reasonable."' l98 The court rea-
soned that the ICC had acted within its power here because the ICC
needed to reassess its statutory interpretations in light of the
changes wrought by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. The court con-
cluded that "the ICC decision represents a reasonable accommoda-
tion of conflicting policies that were committed to its administration
by the [ICA]," and affirmed the ICC's recommendation and the dis-
trict court's judgment in all respects. 199
F. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Position
Five months before the Eighth Circuit's decision in Maislin, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the unfiled negotiated rates
controversy in In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc. 2 0 In an opinion
directly opposite the Eighth Circuit's, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a]
shipper that pleads unreasonableness as a defense cannot prevent
enforcement of the filed tariff doctrine or force the district court to
stay proceedings and refer the case to the Commission."201
197. Id. The court found that it would be an unreasonable practice for Maislin to
collect the higher filed rate where Maislin had negotiated and conducted business at
lower rates it failed to file. Id.
198. Id. at 406. The court stated:
[Tihe Commission, faced with new developments or in light of reconsidera-
tion of the relevant facts and its mandate, may alter its past interpretation
and overturn past administrative rulings and practice .... Regulatory agen-
cies do not establish rules of conduct to last forever; they are supposed,
within the limits of the law and of fair and prudent administration, to adapt
their rules and practices to the Nation's needs in a volatile, changing
economy.
Id. (quoting American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 416
(1967)).
199. Id. at 406.
200. 864 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989). Before the court was an "archetypal 'negoti-
ated rate case' involving ... [t]he well-worn choreography for these cases." Id.
201. Id. at 392. The court reasoned that "[t]he rule is necessary to protect the
filed tariff doctrine and its underlying policy of ensuring reasonable and non-discrim-
inatory rates." Id. The court also quoted Judge (now Justice) Scalia's argument in
Regular Common Carrier Conference v. United States, 793 F.2d 376, 379 (D.C. Cir.
1986), as support for the Fifth Circuit's decision:
Th[e] requirement [that shippers and carriers adhere to filed rates] is utterly
central to the [Interstate Commerce] Act. Without it, for example, it would
be monumentally difficult to enforce the requirement that rates be reason-
able and non-discriminatory, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701 & 10741(b), and virtu-
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The court rejected the shipper's argument that the ICC had pri-
mary jurisdiction.202 The court refused to defer to the ICC, and de-
clined to follow the ICC's recommendation in Negotiated Rates I that
equitable defenses should be allowed.203 As to the shipper's unrea-
sonableness defense, the court stated that precedent compelled it to
strictly enforce the filed rate. 204 This precedent was the United
States Supreme Court's formulation of the filed rate doctrine in Lou-
isville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell.205 Curiously,.however, the Fifth
Circuit omitted the doctrine's exception, "unless [the rate] is found
by the Commission to be unreasonable."206 This deletion, coupled
with the court's seemingly flippaoit approach to the case in gen-
eral,20 7 diminished the credibility of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning.
III. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' statement of the law in Mais-
lin was accurate, its interpretation correct, and its holding proper. It
should be upheld on review by the United States Supreme Court.20 8
The remainder of this comment will discuss why the filed rate doc-
trine is an inappropriate regulatory device in the interstate trucking
industry, why the industry should never have been so rigidly regu-
lated in the first place, and why the risk of discrimination is of slight
concern today. The analysis will also elaborate on the Eighth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the filed rate doctrine, the rule against equita-
ally impossible for the public to assert its right to challenge the lawfulness of
existing or proposed rates, see 49 U.S.C. §§ 10708(a)(l) & 11701(a).
Id. at n.5.
202. Id. at 389-90. The court correctly cited the law. In rejecting the shipper's
argument for referral, the court reasoned: "Here... the facts do not raise technical
or complex issues, regarding appropriate rates, that require the expert administra-
tion of the Commission and thereby invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine.... In
reality, this dispute concerns only the applicability of [the filed rate doctrine]." Id. at
389-90.
203. Id. at 391. The court stated: "The Commission's advisory opinion in [Nego-.
tiated Rates I] is inapposite to this case. The Commission's expression of its decision
to allow equitable defenses.. . has, of course, no binding effect upon this court." Id.
204. Id. at 391-92. The court explained: "Any other decision would constitute
legislation on our part; it would create an exception that swallows the [filed rate]
doctrine and thereby would vitiate a long-standing and notorious policy which Con-
gress has visited and left intact." Id. at 392.
205. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
206. Maxwell, 237 U.S. at 97. See In re Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc., 864 F.2d
at 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1989).
207. The court used the following headings: "A Great Deal While It Lasted,"
"Where's the Beef?" and "Additional Beefs." Id. at 389, 393.
208. In a brief filed at the Court's request, the Solicitor General supported the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision and urged the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 5, 13, Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel,
Inc., 879 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990).
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ble defenses, the ICC's primary jurisdiction, and the ICC's
harmonization of the ICA's provisions. The comment concludes
with a description of the negotiated rates doctrine as a blueprint for
the future.
4. The Filed Rate Doctrine Today
The filed rate doctrine is inappropriate and irrelevant in today's
highly competitive and diversified interstate motor carrier industry.
Its unsuitability is evidenced by the ultimate collapse of the tariff fil-
ing system in the regulatory scheme created by Congress under the
Motor Carrier Act of 1980.209
The doctrine was conceived as a mechanical regulatory tool and
has been used most appropriately and most successfully in the regu-
lation of public utilities.210 The mechanical regulation of the various
modes of interstate common carrier21l transportation by means of
the filed rate doctrine has historically been justified on the grounds
that the industry as a whole was quasi-public and was thus appropri-
ately classified as a public utility. 212 This was the case in the latter
209. Congress' failure to exempt common motor carriers from the ICA's tariff fil-
ing requirements with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 remains a mystery. See 1988
House Hearing, supra note 112, at 38-39 (ICC Chairman Gradison):
Tariff filing requirements need to be made optional or eliminated alto-
gether.
We have a serious problem with negotiated rates. We cannot police the
millions of transactions that take place in a given year, nor should we. It's
impossible to fathom going back and investigating charges against parties
for mutually-agreed upon transactions which took place as long as five years
ago. The filed rate doctrine requires parties to function in the world of pa-
per and the delays that paper transfer cause on the one hand, and yet meet
the demands of just-in-time inventories on the other. The two worlds can
only be reconciled when the Commission is able to allow parties to success-
fully and instantly negotiate using 1980's technology. We need your help,
and total motor carrier deregulation is the solution.
210. See Robinson, supra note 56, at 215. "Leaving its 'reasonableness' aside, a
rate once filed and published establishes a most-neatly-to-be-administered bit of
mechanism for combating discrimination. It serves as a common denominator
among customers, and as a yardstick wherewith regulations and litigation measure off
the utility's treatment of them." Id. The "current device for securing [equality of
treatment by public utilities] is ... a throwback to . . . 'strict law.' Therein the chief
end of law was certainty; rules were wholly inelastic and inflexible, and formalism
reigned... . . The [filed rate doctrine] . . . represents a choice of what is rated the
lesser evil." Id. at 214. The mechanical application of the "filed rate means to
achieve certainty at the expense of principles which, in other branches of the law,
leave one upon whose actions others rely to bear the reasonable costs of his own
errors." Id. at 241.
211. " '[Clommon carrier' means an express carrier, a pipeline carrier, a rail car-
rier, a sleeping car carrier, a motor common carrier, a water common carrier, and a
household goods freight forwarder." 49 U.S.C.S. § 10102(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1989).
212. " 'Common carrier status has a quasi-public character, which arises out of the
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part of the nineteenth century. The monopolistic and destructively
competitive railroads2' 3 squarely fit the public utility definition.214
Conversely, the trucking industry was never an appropriate candi-
date for regulation within the public utility model and should not
have been so regulated.215 Congress brought interstate trucking
under federal control for all the wrong reasons. 2 16 Congress disre-
garded the fact that the trucking industry lacks the characteristics of
either a public utility or a natural monopoly, and would be improp-
erly regulated as such.217 By bringing the trucking industry under
the control of the ICA and the ICC in 1935, Congress transformed a
underaking 'to carry for all people indifferently.'" Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 660 F.2d 668, 674 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Na-
tional Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
213. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
214. A public utility is:
A privately owned and operated business whose services are so essen-
tial to the general public as to justify the grant of special franchises for the
use of public property or of the right of eminent domain, in consideration of
which the owners must serve all persons who apply, without discrimination.
It is always a virtual monopoly. A business or service which is engaged in regu-
larly supplying the public with some commodity or service which is of public
consequence and need, such as electricity, gas, water, transportation, or tel-
ephone or telegraph service.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1108 (5th ed. 1979)(emphasis added).
215. "The experience of trucking regulation... provides a striking example of the
economic and social harm which results when classical regulation is imposed on a
competitive industry." Hardaway, supra note 88, at 127.
Compare the public utility definition, supra note 214, with the characteristics of the
trucking industry in which competition is natural and "there are no great economies
of scale; entry is easy.". Adams, Can Regulation Curb Corporate Power?, in PUBLIC UTIL-
rrY REGULATION 13, 17 (1975). "Unrestricted competition in trucking would be sta-
ble and efficient, because fixed costs ... are low, or nonexistent. [C]osts ... are not
sunk costs to any significant degree. Trucks may be freely and costlessly transferred,
[absent] regulation, from one market to another, and so the industry as a whole can
respond quickly to unforeseen changes in demand." W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF
NATURAL MONOPOLY 28 (1982). Indeed, there were over 39,000 ICC-regulated mo-
tor carriers in 1988. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 632.
216. "The only reason the trucking industry was ever brought under regulation of
the ICC through the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 was the insistence of the railroads.
The railroads argued that the trucking industry was affording it 'excessive, destruc-
tive,'. . . competition." Adams, supra note 215, at 17. The purpose of the MCA of
1935 was to protect the profit levels of the railroads and to protect traditional rate
structures of agricultural and bulk commodities, usually shipped by railroad, at the
expense of manufactured goods which were increasingly being transported by truck.
W. SHARKEY, supra note 215, at 26-27.
217. "A natural monopoly is one resulting where one firm of efficient size can
produce all or more than market can take at remunerative price." BLACK's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 908 (5th ed. 1979).
" '[T]he early railroads, telephone, telegraph, gas, and electric companies, and
to some extent, television and radio [were natural monopolies].... Regulation seeks
to substitute what is lacking in the marketplace by insisting that such natural monop-
olies produce at a lower price and high volume than they otherwise might.' " Demp-
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naturally competitive industry into one that quickly became anticom-
petitive and monopolistic.
The original purpose of the ICA-to protect the shipping public
from the abuses of common carriers-was forgotten.218 Instead,
until the mid-1970s the ICC was the protector of the vested interests
of motor carriers.219 The ICC did so by sheltering the industry from
the rigors of competition22O and by sanctioning its monopolistic
practices. 22' Thus perhaps it should not be surprising that the mo-
tor carrier industry has continued to disregard the rights of the ship-
ping public by attempting to reforge the filed rate doctrine to the
disadvantage of shippers. If the carrier interests are allowed to con-
tinue to do so, the primary purpose of the ICA will be turned on its
head and its contravention will be complete.
sey, supra note 29, at 336 n.2. (quoting Dempsey, Erosion of the Regulating Process in
Transportation-The Winds of Change, 47 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 303, 311-12 & n.31 (1980)).
[T]rucking was regulated with a backward look at railroads instead of a for-
ward projection toward maximizing motor carrier opportunities and effi-
ciencies .... The policy to ignore obvious differences between the modes
as to competitive opportunities and financial risks was never explained. The
decision was made to conform an entirely new industry to the model of one
that was nature but sluggish and, in many respects, failing. This lack of
foresight was common to both Congress and the ICC.
Jacobs, supra note 87, at 135.
218. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
219. See Adams, supra note 215, at 17:
[I]n . . . naturally competitive industries, there really is no excuse for the
government's playing a role, because the government will only be a protec-
tive device for vested interest. It will be a mask for privilege, a shield for
monopoly. It will not be an agency for the public interest. An outstanding
and admittedly extreme example of this proposition is the trucking industry.
See also Bachmann, Johnson & Schneider, The 1980 Motor Carrier Act Ten Years Later: Do
Trucking Company CEOs Love It or Hate It?, 57 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 163 (1990) (they hate
it).
220. See W. SHARKEY, supra note 215, at 27. "Ultimately, the ICC was perceived by
economists as an agency whose primary function was to protect all carriers in the
transportation industry from the rigors of competition." Id. "Congress created a
centrally planned transportation sector at the heart of an intentionally unplanned
economy. The result was to be an artificial allocation of transportation resources."
Jacobs, supra note 87, at 95.
221. With the Sherman Antitrust Act, in effect since 1890, Congress declared
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States... to be illegal." 15 U.S.C.S. § 1 (Law. Co-op. West Supp.
1989). With the Reed-Bulwinkle Act in 1948, supra note 90, however, Congress ex-
cluded interstate motor carriers from this fundamental prohibition by giving them
the authority to collectively discuss and establish rates without the threat of antitrust
prosecution. "[T]he focus of the ICC's attention was to protect regulated carriers
from unauthorized operations . . . [T]he ICC operate[d] as an agency to enforce a
cartel among its regulated carriers." Franzen, supra note 45, at 630. Hence, the mo-
nopolistic, non-market-influenced, anticompetitive, wasteful pre-1980 interstate mo-
tor carrier industry emerged.
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B. The Rule Against Unreasonable Discrimination
Issues of discrimination are no longer relevant in today's highly
competitive interstate trucking industry.222 The main function of the
filed rate doctrine was to prevent carriers from engaging in practices
that were unreasonably preferential or discriminatory to shippers.223
The filed rate doctrine operated to bar such discrimination by
preventing a carrier from offering a discrimination by intentionally
misquoting rates.2 24 Today, carriers are unlikely to so discriminate
in a regulatory climate225 where shippers have a wide variety of ship-
222. Indeed, competition is a transportation condition justifying what might
otherwise be an unreasonable discrimination. See supra note 41 (third paragraph). See
also Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at 106. "[W]e are firmly convinced that our
prior policy of applying Section 10761 strictly regardless of the circumstances is inap-
propriate and unnecessary to deter discrimination today." Id.
223. See supra notes 55 & 59 and accompanying text.
224. Id. See also Louisville & N. R.R. v. McMullan, 5 Ala. App. 662, 667, 59 So.
683, 684 (1912). "It is apparent that [by allowing actual or intentional mistakes to
render the filed rate doctrine inapplicable,] a wide door would be thrown open for an
evasion of a law which was called into existence for the protection of shippers from
unjust and ruinous discrimination." Id.
225. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 625.
In Negotiated Rates I, the ICC stated that its
former policy of penalizing shippers for carriers' mistakes regardless of the
circumstances is unnecessary and inappropriate to deter discrimination
under today's statutory scheme ....
... [T]he MCA [of 19801 dramatically altered the competitive atmos-
phere of the motor carrier industry. The relaxation of regulatory require-
ments and Commission oversight has resulted in intense, new competition.
Thousands of carriers have entered the market with broad operating author-
ity and increased pricing freedom. The new business atmosphere requires
these carriers to price competitively and on extremely short notice if they
are to retain existing traffic or quickly obtain new ... traffic.
Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at 105.
"[T]oday, shippers do not depend upon regulation to protect them from dis-
criminatory pricing; in most circumstances, there are simply more competitive op-
tions." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 632. See also Buckeye Cellulose Corp. v.
Louisville & N. R.R., 1 I.C.C. 2d 767, 772-73 (1985):
In a number of ways, Congress has moved the transportation industry to-
ward greater reliance on market forces by reducing regulation. Some of
these changes specifically permit activities that could formerly have been
prohibited as discriminatory ....
Today, the inability of a shipper to rely on a carrier's interpretation of a
tariff is a greater evil than the remote possibility that a carrier might inten-
tionally misquote an applicable tariff rate to discriminate illegally between
shippers. ...
We are confident that we may order a waiver of undercharges in a case
such as this without encouraging carriers to indulge in intentional discrimi-
natory rate "misquotations." [This] does not create an easy avenue for
discrimination.
See also C. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 29, at 332-33:
Given the cost characteristics of the motor carrier industry, it would seem
that their rates would be close to marginal and average costs, and that dis-
crimination would be a relatively rare occurrence .... The rates of unregu-
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The ultimate purpose of the ICA's antidiscrimination provisions
remains: to protect the shipping public from motor carrier abuses.227
In the wake of regulatory reform, a strict policy barring all discrimi-
nation among shippers is incompatible with Congress' stated goal of
fostering competition,228 particularly where the former policy would
disadvantage shippers. Thus, the use of the ICA's antidiscrimination
provisions as the basis for a policy allowing motor carriers to abuse
shippers by subverting of the reasons behind the traditionally strict
application of the filed rate doctrine is inappropriate.229
C. Uniformity Through Deference to the ICC
Where the purpose of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to
ensure uniformity of regulation by ensuring uniformity of enforce-
lated motor carriers do appear to be closely related to costs. However, the
situation is different with respect to regulated [preregulatory reform] motor
carriers, due to restrictive entry control, rate bureaus, and minimum rate
and suspension orders .... Sans regulated entry and minimum rates, com-
petitive market restraints would insure that the rates of regulated carriers
would be closely related to average and marginal costs [and discrimination
thus avoided].
See also Seaboard System R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635 (11 th Cir. 1986). "The
[ICA], as amended, still embodies the policies of nondiscrimination and uniformity.
The primary authority to give effect to those policies, though, is reposed in the ICC."
Id. at 638.
226. See Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 631-32:
[T]here has been nothing in the records of the [unfiled negotiated rates]
cases we have reviewed to suggest that it was the intent of the parties to
establish secret, discriminatory rates. Rather, the carriers simply negotiated
these rates to attract business, not with any intent to prefer one of their
shippers to the disadvantage of others. Indeed, the effort was to promote
and sell the carrier's service generally, not to attrat [sic] a particular
customer.
See also 1988 House Hearing, supra note 112, at 38:
Perhaps the most troublesome.area of motor carrier regulation is tariff
filing for common carriers. Over 1.2 million tariffs were filed in fiscal year
1987. Few rate changes were protested. The current level of price change
is characteristic of a fluid market where carriers respond to specific customer
needs and demands. Issues of discrimination are no longer relevant when
shippers have a variety of options.
227. See Brown Transport Corp. v. McLean Trucking, 367 I.C.C. 943, 948 (1984)
(anti-discrimination provisions contained in ICA section 10741 intended for the sole
protection of shippers). The ICC stated that it did not believe that its policy would
"lead to unreasonable discrimination. Shippers in today's marketplace are protected
from unreasonable discrimination by vigorous competition. As a result of changes in
the law and our interpretation of it, the range of activities considered discriminatory
is much narrower than it formerly was." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 632.
228. See infra note 236.
229. "Conduct likely to lead to injury must not be allowed to justify itself by a
claimed righteous public policy which is of doubtful relevance." Griffin Grocery Co.
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 93 Ga. App. 546, 549, 92 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1956) (seller not
held to filed rate doctrine in non-undercharge case).
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ment among the courts,230 the negotiated rates controversy presents
a classic situation in which reference and deference to the ICC
should be required.231 The split among the circuits adequately bears
this out. The regulatory disparity is even more greatly magnified at
the lower court level. At one end of the spectrum are courts which
have held for the carrier by blindly adhering'to outmoded notions of
discrimination.232 At the other end are courts which not only hold
for the shipper, but hit the carrier with the shipper's attorney's fees
as well, declaring that the carrier "exercised bad faith in bringing
and maintaining [an] action" for undercharges against the
shipper.233
D. Harmonization of the ICA's Provisions
What the ICC did in Negotiated Rates I and Negotiated Rates II was to
harmonize two facially conflicting provisions of the ICA: the reasona-
bleness requirement234 and the filed rate doctrine.235 The ICC had
the authority to do so for three main reasons. First, it remains within
the ICC's congressional mandate to interpret the ICA and to appro-
priately respond to "current marketplace developments and
230. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
231. The ICC recognized that "while each individual case affects primarily the
parties to that case, each case is also part of what now is clearly a growing pattern and
nationwide problem of large scope, and, cumulatively, may affect litigation in other
cases." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 635.
232. See, e.g., Orscheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 708 F. Supp. 845,
(N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 899 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1990). The court
offered the self-serving argument that the ICC's decision in Negotiated Rates I "is
fundamentally flawed in that it can foster discrimination both by removing the incen-
tive of shippers to ascertain whether the negotiated rate has been filed and also by
inducing carriers to be less vigilant in filing the rate with the Commission." Id. at
858. The court apparently considered the filed rate doctrine to be an end in itself.
Such reasoning is flawed in at least two ways. First, it loses sight of the primary
purpose of the rule against discrimination, which is to protect shippers. Second, it
neglects to link the purpose and function of the filed rate doctrine with the current
regulatory scheme as a whole. But see Goodman, supra note 134, at 313 (advocating
continued strict adherence to the rule against discrimination and the filed rate doc-
trine as the "last assurance[s] of rate equality"). Goodman forgets that rate equality
was not a goal of the 1980 Act. For a discussion of the goals of the 1980 Act, see infra
note 236.
233. West Coast Truck Lines, Inc. v. Lily-Tulip, Inc., No. CV 87-0929-RMT(Px),
slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 1989). "Considering the time and labor required,
novelty and difficulty of questions involved, skill needed to perform the legal services
required herein, and customary hourly fee, $51,305.00 is a reasonable amount of
attorneys fees." Id. at 1-2.
234. 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1989). For text of the
statute, see supra note 13.
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problems." 23 6 Second, nowhere in the ICA is the filed rate doctrine
elevated over the reasonableness requirement. 23 7 The two provi-
sions are "co-equal." 23 8 Third, the Supreme Court has not barred
the ICC from considering equitable defenses to the filed rate doc-
trine where a rate or practice "is found by the Commission to be
unreasonable."239
Thus, the ICC declared that "[o]ur unreasonable practice findings
are legal, rather than purely equitable determinations. "240 As the
236. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 629. See also H.R. Rep. No. 296, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2283, 2294:
It is clearly the Committee's intent that the [Interstate Commerce] Commis-
sion must recognize the importance of competition and efficiency in motor
carrier operations as the most desirable means for achieving national transpor-
tation goals and objectives .... [C]ompetition and efficiency will normally
be reinforcing concepts. However, the Committee recognizes that there
may be situations where the Commission will be required to balance these
concepts in order to determine what is in the public interest .... [T]he Act is
intended to... provid[e] the Commission with sufficient flexibility to pro-
mote the public interest.
(emphasis added). But see Dempsey, supra note 95, at 46: "Congress did not grant
the ICC unlimited authority in the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 to bring about a radical
transformation in the economic environment of the motor carrier industry." (foot-
note omitted).
237. The ICC stated that its "determinations involve a harmonization of two dif-
ferent provisions of the same statute. Section 10761 is only part of an overall regula-
tory scheme; it should not be elevated over the unreasonable practices provision of
§ 10701." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 627. Moreover, "[tihe fact that the
Commission may not have exercised its unreasonable practice authority in the nego-
tiated rates area in this manner until recently does not mean that the agency lacks
such authority or cannot use it in this manner." Id. at 629.
238. Id. at 628.
239. Louisville & N. R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915). This phrase is the
general exception to the filed rate doctrine. For the text of the entire quote, see supra
text accompanying note 58. In its analysis of the controversy, the-Fifth Circuit omit-
ted this phrase-while including the surrounding text-when it quoted Maxwell. In re
Caravan Refrigerated Cargo, Inc., 864 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1989). See supra note
206 and accompanying text.
The ICC noted that "Maxwell ... never said that the Commission could not deter-
mine whether a carrier's solicitation, publication and billing practices are unreasona-
ble.... Maxwell... 'dealt [only] with the courts' authority to grant equitable defenses
to undercharge actions.' " Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 628 (quoting Sea-
board System R.R. v. United States, 794 F.2d 635, 638 (11 th Cir. 1986) (word in
brackets in original)).
240. Id. Thus, the ICC is not allowing shippers to defend these actions with
purely or even substantially equitable defenses:
We recognize that [Negotiated Rates I] ... and some of our subsequent
decisions spoke in terms of "equitable defenses" to claims for un-
dercharges. While our unreasonable practice rulings are "equitable" in the
sense that they are intended to result in decisions that are fair to the parties,
they are based upon the legal requirements of § 10701 and may be more
appropriately viewed as the basis for a counterclaim or as mooting the origi-
nal action for undercharges.
Id. at 628 n. 11.
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Eighth Circuit declared in Maislin, "the ICC decision represents a
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were commit-
ted to its-administration by the Interstate Commerce Act."2 4I
IV. THE NEGOTIATED RATES DOCTRINE
The changed regulatory structure and the profound effect these
changes have wrought in the interstate trucking industry have neces-
sitated a rational reinterpretation, or harmonization, of the provi-
sions242 and goals 243 of the current ICA. The "negotiated rates
doctrine"244 has emerged as a new basis for avoiding the strict appli-
cation of the filed rate doctrine in motor carrier negotiated rates un-
dercharge cases.
The doctrine states: A motor common carrier which (1) negotiates
with a shipper a rate that the carrier represents ps, and the shipper
reasonably believes is or will become the lawfully filed rate, (2) fails,
for whatever reason, to file the lower negotiated rate with the ICC,
(3) bills and accepts payment from the shipper at the negotiated rate,
and (4) later demands payment of the difference between the filed
rate and the negotiated rate, has engaged in an unreasonable prac-
tice in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act and is estopped
from collecting any undercharges thus arising.
The negotiated rates doctrine is designed to achieve uniformity of
regulation by imposing a greater degree of certainty in negotiated
rates dealings between shippers and motor carriers. It is derived
from NITL proposals,2 45 ICC policy statements, 246 and legislative
241. Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 879 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir. 1989).
242. 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 10701(a), 10741(b) & 10761(a) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp.
1989).
243. The ICC noted, "there must be a balance drawn among the sometimes com-
peting congressional goals of fairness, competition, nondiscrimination, and uniform-
ity." Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 627.
244. The label "negotiated rates doctrine" was used as a general term in an unat-
tributed item in a transportation industry publication to refer to the decisions of the
ICC in Negotiated Rates I and II. See ICCJust Says No To Undercharge Cases, TRAFFIC
WORLD, December 25, 1989, at 13. To the author's knowledge, the author is the first
to attach the label to a concrete and succinct formulation of the law as it now stands.
The elements of the doctrine are derived from a variety of sources. See infra notes
245-53 and accompanying text. Compare with Goodman, supra note 134, at 310 (dis-
cussing "The Commission's New Unfiled Rate Doctrine").
245. The negotiated rates doctrine adopts, clarifies, and builds upon the two
NITL proposals. Like the NITL proposals, the negotiated rates doctrine has been
designed to create a rebuttable presumption in favor of the application of the negoti-
ated rate. Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at 102 n.8. In its petition that led to
Negotiated Rates I, the NITL proposed that the ICC declare negotiated rates to be
the maximum lawful rates where the carrier failed to file those rates and where the
shipper acted with a good faith belief that those rates had been filed. Id. at 99-100.
For the full text of the first NITL proposal, see supra note 130. In its petition that led
to Negotiated Rates II, the NITL requested the ICC to issue a declaratory order
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initiatives.247 These are all grounded in the common law princi-
ples248 of promissory and equitable estoppel,2 49 negligence,250 mis-
stating that it is an unreasonable practice per se for a carrier to conduct business at but
fail to file a negotiated rate. Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 623.
246. The course of conduct prohibited by the negotiated rates doctrine is substan-
tially derived from the course of conduct described as unreasonable by the ICC in
Negotiated Rates II. Compare the four elements of the negotiated rates doctrine with
Negotiated Rates II, supra note 14, at 628 n.11:
Rather than creating an exception or defense to the filed rate doctrine,
what the Commission is finding to be an unreasonable practice is a course of
conduct consisting of: (1) negotiating a rate; (2) agreeing to a rate that the
shipper reasonably relies upon as being lawfully filed; (3) failing, either will-
fully or otherwise, to publish the rate; (4) billing and accepting payment at
the negotiated rate for (sometimes) numerous shipments; and (5) then de-
manding additional payment at higher rates.
Implied but not explicitly stated in the negotiated rates doctrine is the concept
articulated by the ICC in its first declaration on the subject, in Negotiated Rates I,
where the ICC stated that it has the authority to "decide if the collection of un-
dercharges would be an unreasonable practice." Negotiated Rates I, supra note 15, at
100.
247. For the text of the current proposal before Congress, H.R. 3243, see supra
notes 152 & 154. Note that the bill only partially endorses the negotiated rates doc-
trine-it still requires case-by-case referral to the ICC. Since the ICC is already un-
able to administer the flood of undercharge cases, the referral requirement is the
bill's potentially fatal flaw.
248. Compare the principles enunciated infra notes 249-252 with Robinson, supra
note 56, at 241: "[T]he typical mechanical applications of the... filed rate [doctrine
seek] to achieve certainty at the expense of principles which, in other branches of the
law, leave one upon whose actions others rely to bear the reasonable costs of his own
errors."
249. Promissory estoppel is:
That which arises when there is a promise which promisor should reason-
ably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on part of promisee, and which does induce such action or for-
bearance, and such promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of promise.
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1093 (5th ed. 1979). See also id. at 494:
Estoppel... operates to put party entitled to its benefits in same position as
if thing represented were true. Under law of "estoppel" where one of two
innocent persons must suffer, he whose act occasioned loss must bear it.
Elements or essentials of estoppel include change of position of parties so
that party against whom estoppel is invoked has received a profit or benefit
or party invoking estoppel has changed his position to his detriment.
(citations omitted).
The negotiated rates doctrine incorporates these elements to the extent that it
would prevent carriers from denying liability for failing to file a negotiated rate when
it was reasonably apparent to the shipper that the carrier would do so. The doctrine
would bind the carrier to statements or actions which reasonably induced the shipper
to refrain from verifying the rate on file with the ICC. It would put the shipper in the
same position as if the negotiated rate had been filed; i.e. liability would be imposed
only for the negotiated rather than the filed rate. See also Note, supra note 55, at
506-507. The "six interrelated elements which have been used to decide whether
the [FERC's] filed rate doctrine should be waived" are good cause, notice, the valid-
ity of private contracts, reliance, equity, and public policy. Id. Such principles should
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representation, 25 ' and unjust enrichment. 25 2 It is the combination
of these common law violations which results in a reasonable prac-
tice finding in negotiated rates cases. Most significantly, therefore,
the negotiated rates doctrine is based upon-and derives its author-
ity from-the ICA's requirement that a carrier's practices be
reasonable.253
be taken into account when analyzing negotiated rates disputes, and have been inte-
grated into the negotiated rates doctrine. But see supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
250. Negligence is "[tihe omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs,
would do." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979). According to this defini-
tion, a carrier's failure to file a negotiated rate can usually be termed as negligent.
The negotiated rates doctrine would hold carriers liable for, or at least preclude them
from profiting from, their own negligence. But see supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
251. Misrepresentation is "[a]ny manifestation by words or other conduct by one
person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in ac-
cordance with the facts.... That which, if accepted, leads the mind to an apprehen-
sion of a condition other and different from that which exists." BLACK'S LAW
DicTIONARY 903 (5th ed. 1979). Here again, the negotiated rates doctrine would
prevent carriers from abusing the filed rate doctrine and profiting from their own
misrepresentations. But see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
252. The doctrine of unjust enrichment states:
[O]ne person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at expense
of another.... Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and re-
tains money or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another. Thus
one who has conferred a benefit upon another solely because of a basic mis-
take of fact induced by a nondisclosure is entitled to restitution on above
doctrine.
BLAcK's LAw DiC'IONARY 1377 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted). To allow a carrier
to recover undercharges resulting from the carrier's failure to file negotiated rates
would unjustly enrich the carrier. The negotiated rates doctrine would operate to
preclude such unjust enrichment.
253. Of course, this is the most important and overriding basis for the negotiated
rates doctrine-it is based on the ICA itself. See 49 U.S.C.S. § 10701(a) (Law. Co-op.
1979 & Supp. 1989) (text of statute quoted supra note 13). For a discussion of the
reasonableness requirements, see supra notes 28-50, 234-41 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the distinction between legal and lawful rates, see supra note 63.
See also Tift v. Southern R.R., 138 F. 753 (C.C. Ga. 1905), aff'd, 148 F. 1021 (5th Cir.
1906), aff'd, 206 U.S. 428 (1906):
The administration of justice, said Webster, "is the chiefest concern of a
man upon earth." Within the scope of that function of government there is,
perhaps, no single topic of greater magnitude or moment than controversies
which arise in trade and commerce. Said Sir Walter Raleigh, "Whosoever
commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and
consequently the world itself." In a material sense, and in our astonishing
civilization, nothing is more important than the transportation of commodi-
ties sold or interchanged, and in transportation the stability and reasonable
character of the rates charged therefor is scarcely less important than trans-
portation itself. The three grand departments of government, legislative,
executive, and judicial, are with steady and swerveless purpose enacting or
enforcing laws to safeguard the rights of the general public, and as well that
portion engaged in the business of transportation. The shippers are appeal-
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CONCLUSION
Unfiled negotiated rates will continue to be a reality in the trucking
industry. For every balance-due bill that has already been sent, there
are many more waiting to be discovered as additional trucking com-
panies go bankrupt or otherwise cease to do business with a shipper.
Due to the extent of the problem, the ICC will remain incapable of
addressing these disputes on a case-by-case basis. The courts need
more than mere ICC guidelines in order to resolve, and to head-off,
these disputes. Congress needs to take a stronger stand. A solution
is the negotiated rates doctrine.
Christopher P. Chilstrom
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